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ABSTRACT 
The Vernacular Discourse of the “Arab Spring” is a project that bridges the 
divide between the East and the West by offering new readings to Arab subjectivities. 
Through an analysis of the “Arab Spring” through the lens of vernacular discourse, it 
challenges the Euro-Americo-centric legacies of Orientalism in Western academia and 
the new wave of extremism in the Arab world by offering alternative representations of 
Arab bodies and subjectivities. To offer this new reading of the “Arab Spring,” it 
explores the foundations of critical rhetoric as a theory and a practice and argues for a 
turn towards a critical vernacular discourse. The turn towards critical vernacular 
discourse is important as it urges the analyses of different artifacts produced by 
marginalized groups in order to understand their perspectives that have largely been 
foreclosed in traditional cultural studies research. Building on embodied/performative 
critical rhetoric, the vernacular discourses of the Arab revolutionary body examines other 
forms of knowledge productions that are not merely textual; more specifically, through 
data gathered in the Lhbib Bourguiba, Tunisia. This analysis of the political revolutionary 
body unveils the complexity underlining the discussion around issues of identity, agency 
and representation in the Middle East and North Africa, and calls for a critical study 
towards these issues in the region beyond the binary approach that has been practiced and 
applied by academics and media analysts. Hence, by analyzing vernacular discourse, this 
	  
iii 
research locates a method of examining and theorizing the dialectic between agency, 
citizenry, and subjectivity through the study of how power structure is recreated and 
challenged through the use of the vernacular in revolutionary movements, as well as how 
marginalized groups construct their own subjectivities through the use of vernacular 
discourse. Therefore, highlighting the political prominence of evaluating the Arab Spring 
as a vernacular discourse is important in creating new ways of understanding 
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CHAPTER ONE: CONTEXTUALIZING THE “ARAB SPRING”  
Background: The “Arab Spring” 
Since December 17, 2010, the term “Arab Spring1” has been adopted to describe a 
set of demonstrations dispatched by the self-immolation of a fruit vendor named 
Mohamed Bouazizi (Adib-Moghhaddam; Al-Ali; Kraidy; Matar). Within weeks, what 
originated as a spark with the Tunisian vendor, Bouazizi, emerged as a turmoil that 
astounded the Arab region and rest of the world. Hence, the general concept of the “Arab 
Spring” is that of a movement that started in Tunisia and swept across North Africa and 
into the Middle East. This movement then led to the ousting of the Tunisian, Egyptian 
and Libyan governments and saw significant unrest in other countries (Adib-
Moghhaddam; Al-Ali; Kraidy; Matar).  
However, soon after the emergence of the “Arab Spring,” academics and media 
experts ran to provide diverse interpretations in regards to the origins and the motives of 
the demonstrations and the revolutions as a whole, as well as to what and who should be 
“blamed” for the movement. For instance, the U.S. media coverage of the “Arab Spring” 
was based mainly on Orientalist storylines that categorized the “Arab Spring” as either a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this research project, I chose to use the phrase “Arab Spring” between quotation 
marks to denote the controversy around the naming of the uprisings, and communicate a 
political stance in alliance with other Arab scholars and citizens (See Rami Khoury; 
Ibrahim N. Abusharif; Maytha Alhassen), who do not describe the movement as a 
“blooming” wave from a “winter slumber,” but rather as a movements that have been 




sweep of extremism and zealotry or a sweep of democratic reform (Adib-Moghhaddam; 
Al-Ali; Matar). However, such dichotomous framing ignores the stories and the bodies of 
many Arab men and women within these revolutions. Additionally, those framings 
reinforce the inevitable narratives of the clash between the West and the East; a logic that 
demonizes the revolutions and flattens the complex realities of the “Arab Spring” and its 
subjectivities. Therefore, I call for an analysis of the “Arab Spring” through the lens of 
vernacular discourse to challenge the Euro-Americo-centric legacies of Orientalism in the 
Western academia and popular culture and offer “new” readings to the representations of 
Arab2 and Muslim3 bodies and subjectivities.  
To pursue this analysis, I consider the “Arab Spring” as an event in the Deleuzian 
sense (as cited in Puar). In Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir Puar calls for looking at events 
within a Deleuzian framework that reflects, “an assemblage of spatial and temporal 
intensities, coming together, dispersing, reconverging” (xviii). In other words, 
considering the “Arab Spring” as an event refuses binaries between past and present, 
between a “history-making moment” and a “history-vanishing moment,” between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   In this research, by Arab people, I refer to those who identify linguistically, culturally 
and diasporically as Arabs (not only genealogical). 
3	  By Muslim, I refer to larger understanding of Muslimness that is not merely faith-based 
but cultural and diasporic. It is not necessarily a series of dogmatic doctrines, the 
definition is fluid and dynamic. In some instances, it could also refer to bodies-that are 




“politicality” versus “stability” (Puar xvii-xx). The “eventness” of the “Arab Spring” 
collapses past, present and future and looks at the “Arab Spring” as a movement between 
the before and the after. Situating the “Arab Spring” as an event helps me look at Arab 
uprisings as an assemblage of theoretical interests, meaning there is not one stand, but 
rather as ideas that converge, diverge and merge. A movement that did not “just” emerge, 
rather a movement is “always-becoming” (Puar xxiv). Foregrounding the political 
urgency of surveying the “Arab Spring” as a vernacular discourse is imperative in forging 

















Preview of Chapters  
The chapters of this dissertation seek to explore and contribute to the scholarly 
conversation about the “Arab Spring” to understand the multiplicities of the event and the 
rhetoric of text, space, and the body. To offer a new reading of the Arab Spring, this 
dissertation explores and examines the foundations of critical rhetoric as a theory and a 
practice -as they emerge, specifically in Avenue Lahbib Bourgiba, in Tunis, Tunisia- and 
argues for a turn towards a critical vernacular discourse. The turn towards critical 
vernacular discourse is significant as it fosters the analyses of different artifacts produced 
by marginalized groups in order to understand their perspectives that have largely been 
foreclosed in traditional cultural studies research.  
Chapter One of this dissertation provides a background on the event of the “Arab 
Spring” and offers a problematization to the framing of this specific event. Then, it 
reviews the literature to understand and contextualize the roots of Orientalists’ discourse 
that have emerged within that framing. This includes further, and more detailed 
discussions of Orientalism as a critical theory and Orientalist feminism as they relate to 
the field of communication more generally and rhetoric more specifically. Chapter Two 
draws on theories of women of color to demonstrate how they forge new understandings 
of the body, subjectivity and events. This theoretical section argues for the importance of 
theorizing through the body and lived experiences to challenge dominant binaries and 
produce alternative discourses. Through an articulation of Muslim feminism, a “new” 
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theoretical framework is introduced to speculate outside traditional frames. It also 
proposes a revisionist model to offer new readings of the “Arab Spring” that is not only 
reduced to the question of whether the “Arab Spring” is good or bad for women. This 
theoretical model also asks us to study the complexities of events, identities, and 
subjectivities. Chapter Three argues for the use of vernacular discourse as a perspective 
to look at the “Other” side of representations. It calls for the critique of vernacular 
discourse as a critical methodology to reveal the indiscernible power dynamics and 
discursive strategies in order to elucidate how the vernacular is used to empower 
marginalized identities and foster mass mobilization for social change. Building on 
Calafell’s embodied/performative critical rhetoric, it analyzes the vernacular discourses 
of the Arab revolutionary body to explore other forms of knowledge productions that are 
not merely textual. This analysis of the political revolutionary body unveils the 
complexity underlining the discussion around issues of identity, agency and 
representation in the Middle East and North Africa, and calls for a critical study towards 
these issues in the region beyond the binary approach that has been practiced and applied 
by academics and media analysts. Hence, by analyzing vernacular discourse, this chapter 
locates a method of examining and theorizing the dialectic between agency, citizenry, and 
subjectivity through the study of how the larger social order is recreated and challenged 
through the use of the vernacular in revolutionary movements, as well as how 
marginalized groups construct their own subjectivities through the use of vernacular 
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discourse. Therefore, highlighting the political prominence of evaluating the Arab Spring 
as a vernacular discourse is important in creating new ways of understanding 
communication in postcolonial/neocolonial settings.  
Chapters Four focuses on vernacular discourses in and about the “Arab Spring” as 
they emerge in Avenue Lhbib Bourgiba. It discusses the merging of rhetorical and 
ethnographic methodologies as a unique and beneficial way to collect data and perform 
the analysis. Specifically, it discusses how investigating Arab vernacular discourse can 
benefit from aspects of a combined methodological approach. Thus, this study of 
vernacular discourse utilizes these multifaceted approaches. As a researcher, I put 
together -in this chapter- pieces of everyday discourse, and address how they create and 
symbolize a larger discourse. Following the praxis of critical rhetoricians, I use 
qualitative methods to fill in the gap between collecting and analyzing communication on 
specific subjects. This particular methodology facilitates demonstrating and examining 
vernacular discourse as a constitutive form that assembles specific ways of understanding 
and framing experiences situations while always prevailing within a larger discourse. In 
this chapter, I provide an analysis of field notes, photographs, and from 40 hours of 
participant-observation over a two-week period in Tunisia. Themes and patterns that were 
revealed in my fieldwork and performances are discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
The chapter also discusses the consequences of privileging the body and event on 
framing and interpreting the phenomenology of the everyday. Specifically, a rhetoric of 
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both the body and event vis-à-vis the “Arab Spring” are presented as a theoretical 
contribution to critical rhetoric. It addresses how a rhetoric of both event and the body 
can be extended to incorporate a framework for critical methods to examination of power 
experienced in the revolutionary space of Tunisia. Finally, the last chapter provides 
conclusions that conjoin the notions of events, body, and identity to critical vernacular 
discourse and extend critical rhetorical theory, more generally, to involve a revolutionary 
rhetoric of Arab subjectivities. The final conclusions of this chapter also explain the 
pragmatic significance of how the praxis of vernacular discourse can facilitate learning 
how the larger social order is recreated and challenged through the use of the vernacular 
in revolutionary movements, as well as how marginalized groups construct their own 












Statement of the Problem and Review of the Literature  
Since the preliminary coverage of the “Arab Spring” several analysts, media 
reports, newspapers have constructed the movement in a dichotomous way and have 
reduced it to, specifically, two main inquiries: “ Is the Arab Spring a wave for freeing 
women or oppressing them?” and “Is the Arab Spring a wave of Islamism and 
extremism?” Moreover, U.S. feminist movements have focused on explaining the roles of 
Arab women in the uprisings and have described the revolts as either “gender-
emancipatory” or “gender-subordinating” (Al-Ali; Mansfield; Cole and Cole). However, 
the ignored stories of many Arab women and men of these revolutions offer a challenge 
to the framing of these discourses on the “Arab Spring.” I advance that the struggles of 
the revolutionaries cannot be explained through “Orientalist tropes” that reduce Arab 
bodies, for instance, to passive victims of culture or religion. Hence, I suggest that rather 
than asking, “ Is the Arab Spring a wave for freeing women or oppressing them?” and “Is 
the Arab Spring a wave of Islamism and extremism?” I ask, instead:  
1. Why does the U.S. public discourse frame the revolution through 
Orientalist tropes and why do U.S. feminists repeat the Orientalist rhetorical assumptions 
of “saving/freeing” Arabs rather than privileging their subjectivities? 
2. How can new readings of the “Arab Spring” challenge the Orientalists’ 




First, I contend that mainstream rhetoric in regards to the “Arab Spring” tend to 
dismiss coalitions that act from the bottom up, from the private sphere to the public 
sphere, and from civic spaces up to the government. In particular, the revolutionary body 
of the “Arab Spring” has demonstrated that the cliché portrayals of Arabs and Muslims 
based on Orientalists’ tropes and their depictions as terrorists, jihadists, evil, perpetual 
foreigners and divergent Others communicate a passé framing of images underlining 
problematic and controversial dogmatic motives (Adib-Moghhaddam). Moreover, the 
Arab revolutionary body rejects rhetorical assumptions that conceptualize an 
idiosyncratic image of “one” Islam, and contests the mainstream media’s framing of Arab 
subjectivities as a predictable clash of civilizations between the progressive West and the 
moronic East (Adib-Moghhaddam). Hence, to think in such dichotomous terms of “us 
versus them,” or “Occidentalism versus Orientalism” logic demonizes this revolutionary 
movement and flattens the complex realities of the “Arab Spring” and its subjectivities.  
Second, it is important to note the resurgence of what I call “U.S. 
femininationalism,” the dual movement in which certain feminist discourses have 
embraced U.S. nationalist agendas and have also been employed by nationalists to 
advance their political agendas (Building on Jasbir Puar’s “homonationalism” 
framework). For instance, in recent years, most of the feminist efforts have been calling 
for the importance of saving Afghan women from Afghan men, and even soliciting for 
occupying-through war- Afghanistan to “induce” emancipation and salvation of the 
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Afghan women Afghanistan (Abu-Lughod). Analogous accounts of liberation and 
salvation were also employed to endorse the U.S. military occupation of Iraq (Al-Ali and 
Pratt). In more current narrative, the U.S. involvement in Libya also adopted the popular 
accounts of saving Muslim women’s bodies as a valid reasoning for the U.S. intervention 
and militarization (Al-Ali). Conversely, the consequences of the strong militarization in 
the region and the increased rhetorical demands of U.S. feminists to save Muslim women 
have affected women in North Africa and the Middle East very differently (Abu-Lughod; 
A-Ali; Al-Ali and Pratt; Al-Ali). First, feminists’ movements and demands are complex 
and diverse, and performed with “cultural and temporal conflict and context” (Abu-
Lughod; Al-Ali). Second, the question of “women” is also complicated because women’s 
rights are being where images of women are coopted into public political narratives to 
achieve political goals or as lenses through which to understand and justify conflicts 
(Abu-Lughod; A-Ali; Al-Ali and Pratt; Al-Ali). Moreover, critical rhetorical analysis has 
suggested that the convergence between women’s rights, govermentality, 
institutionalization, and militarism, has not often “resulted in watershed victories” for 
women (MacKinnon; Puar; Al-Ali). This critical rhetorical call refuses the binary of 
looking at conflicts/revolutions from a “gender-emancipatory discourses” versus “gender-
subordinate” accounts and suggests reading women stories in a more complex way (Al-
Ali). Thus, instead of reiterating the dominant question of either the “Arab Spring” was 
‘bad’ or ‘good’ for “Arab women,” I contend that it’s more important to analyze the 
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discursive and embodied multiplicity of the role that both women and men actually 
played in the “Arab Spring.” In other words, I argue that the experiences of both women 
and men in the “Arab Spring” were -and still are- drastically more diverse, both in 
relation to “the everyday” and in regards to its political implications. Hence, in this 
project, I am interested in exploring the multifaceted, challenging and liminal space in 
which- not only women- but the Arab revolutionary body relate to and with the “Arab 
Spring,” both in terms of citizens’ rights in the public and private spheres, and in terms of 
how those narratives are being used as arts of political accounts or an “assemblage” of 
gender, race, class, sexuality, democracy and Westernization. Borrowing Bernadette M. 
Calafell’s approach to analyzing Latin@ communication studies, I propose an 
embodied/performative critical rhetoric to analyze the vernacular discourse of the Arab 
revolutionary body that explores other forms of knowledge productions that are not 
merely textual. For instance, considering the body as a political vehicle that was used 
during the “Arab Spring” brings to the forefront issues of agency, identity and 
representation that have been merely discussed in dichotomous ways in the media as well 
as academia (see also Matar). Notably, this emphasis on the embodied experience allows 
for reclaiming agency and representation outside the usage of the outdated Orientalist 
tropes, and relocated issues of domination, oppression, and misrepresentation. This 
analysis will also answer questions about the nature of Arab cultural production, 
liberalism, and representation. 
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Orientalism and its Legacies 
Due to the usage of Orientalists tropes throughout the years in framing events in 
regards to the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab revolutionary movements that 
swept across the region puzzled several countries from Europe to North America (Adib-
Moghhaddam). The so-called “wave of democratization” was not expected from citizens 
of the region. Specifically, Arabs and Muslims’ subjectivities were believed to be 
unprogressive, undemocratic, dictatorial, fanatical and unchangeable (Adib-
Moghhaddam). The reemergence of these characteristics during the 21st century in 
regards to Muslims and Arabs was-particularly- prevalent due to the ability of modern 
Orientalists to acculturate those historical analogies and frames of Orientalism to 
accommodate current political motives and domination(Haddad). In terms of the “Arab 
Spring,” most of the current literature has examined the Arab revolutionary body through 
the use of “Orientalist” rhetorical assumptions that have inherited much of its text, image, 
and power from the ancient legacy of Orientalism (Adib-Moghhaddam). Orientalist 
tropes continue to influence writings, framings, and conversations surrounding Islam and 
Muslims through reducing and essentializing them. Islam as a religion and its 
“traditionalism” are seen as incompatible and fundamentally different from the advanced 
West, while Arab and Muslim women are seen are agentless victims of Islam in need of 
salvation (Haddad). Hence, my study calls us to explore these tendencies to avoid their 
reductive inscriptions and produce “new” meanings.      
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Building on these points, I situate my study in a growing field of work addressing 
the racialization and politicization of discourses on Muslims and Arabs. Therefore, for 
this section, I address the long history of contextualizing, creating, and imagining the 
Middle East through a Western lens within the context of Orientalism. Through offering a 
historical review of Orientalism, I argue that it is crucial to explain the historical roots of 
U.S. perceptions of the Middle East in order to understand the current Orientalist 
interpretations of the “Arab Spring.” I also contend the importance of moving beyond 
Orientalists’ analysis to study the uprisings.  
Defining Orientalism 
In 1978, Edward Said published his famous work entitled, Orientalism. In 
Orientalism, Said makes the argument that the long subtle ways of looking and studying 
the Orient are Eurocentric approaches that distorts Arab people and their cultures. This 
essentialized approached that were advanced by, specifically, European colonialists, have 
also impacted the way academics survey and examine the Orient. According to Said, the 
main purpose aim of highlighting Orientalism is to deconstruct the existing Western 
theoretical approaches and to illustrate the destructive nature of Orientalism as an 
academic and cultural approach towards the Middle East (Said). According Said, 
Orientalism is both a theory and a methodology used as analytical framework by 




Orientalism, indeed, revolutionized the study of the Middle East and helped to 
create and shape entire new field of study such as post-colonial theory, as well as 
influencing diverse domains as English, History, Anthropology and Cultural Studies. It is 
one of the controversial scholarly books of the last thirty years. Orientalism tries to 
answer the question of why when we think of the Middle East, for example, we have a 
pre-conceived notion of the people who live there, of what they believe, how they act, 
even though we might have never been there, or indeed met anyone from there (Said). 
More generally, Orientalism asks how we came to understand people, strangers, who 
look different to us, by the virtue of the color of their skin. Edward Said’s central 
argument of Orientalism is the way we acquire this knowledge is not innocent or 
objective, but the end result of a process that reflects certain interests, that, it is highly 
motivated. Specifically, Edward Said argues that the way the West, Europe and the U.S., 
looks at countries and people of the Middle East is through a lens that destroys the actual 
reality of those places and those people. It calls this lens, through which preview this part 
of the world, Orientalism. Hence, Said’s critical theory considers Orientalism as a lens 
through which the West sees and interprets the East. This Eurocentric lens acts, then, as a 
power authority that imagines, builds, exaggerates, and circulate distorted images and 
knowledge in regards Arab people and cultures. As Said contends,  
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for 
dealing with the Orient- dealing with it by making statements about it, 
authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over 
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it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient. (3) 
 
Orientalism, then, is a framework used to understand the unfamiliar and the 
strange to make the people of the Middle East appear different and threatening (Said). 
Edward Said’s contribution to how we understand this general process, of what we can 
call, stereotyping, has been immense.  
The Repertory of Orientalism 
Said locates the construction of Orientalism within the history of imperial 
conquest, as empires conquered the globe, the British and the French conquered the East, 
not just militarily, but also ideologically. The question that the colonizers were concerned 
about is how can they understand the natives that they are encountering so that they can 
conquer them easier. This process of using abstract categories to explain people, who 
look different, has been going on for long time, as long as there is a contact between 
different cultures and people. Orientalism makes this general process formal and 
objective knowledge. Said quotes, Gerard de Nerval, in his book Journey to the Orient, 
where he wrote: “the Orient is all the same essence; unlike the West, it stays the same” 
(19). This ideology creates an image of the Orient outside of history. For example, when 
Napoleon Bonaparte went to Egypt, he invaded the place, not just militarily, but also 
scientifically, by recording everything about Egypt for Europe. The power and the 
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prestige of the European country produced a knowledge for the Europeans and for the 
natives, a knowledge that the native themselves cannot see (Said).  
Building on the work of the French scholar Michel Foucault, Said contends that 
examining the connection between knowledge, knowledge production, and power control 
is a fundamental step in understanding the complex nature of Orientalism. Foucault 
advanced that the “truth” is a type of power structures is and is, indeed deceptive. It is 
deceptive because when you think you are seeing “reality,” it is actually an illusive and 
biased version, not the “truth.” What the person is seeing instead is an interpretation of 
“reality” that has been created and assembled in a structure of hegemonic beliefs and 
meanings (Foucault). According to Said’s underlining of Orientalism, the way Western 
countries view the Middle East is not “reality,” but it’s rather this reimagined version of 
“reality” that was based on a European legacy of colonialism and intervention. In other 
words, the West, specifically Europe, established and produced knowledge in regards to 
the Middle East based on what their own perception of the region. Once assembled, the 
Orient was then distributed to Western populations through academic and cultural outlets 
(Said).  
During the imperial conquests of the Middle East and North Africa in the 19th 
century, most of the European empires established their “reality” of the region based on 
the hegemonic colonial ideology that believes in the superiority of the West over the 
inferiority of the uncivilized East (Said). Said argues that this specific ideological process 
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has resulted in creating a dichotomous mentality of the Eats versus the West. This 
reductive and simplistic lens through which the West views a while region of diverse 
peoples and cultures, communicates unequal power dynamic between the colonizers and 
their colonies (Said). Thus, Orientalism was constructed on political agendas and motives 
of colonial empires, which made the produced “reality” a questionable one. Western 
colonialism of the Middle East also used the ideology of this “God-given” supremacy as 
a reasoning for invasion, exploitation, and discipline of the Eastern barbaric and inferior 
bodies (Said 31-49). Fundamentally, Western colonialism of the Middle East was mainly 
reliant on Orientalism for its conquests (Said). 
According to Said, Orientalism is “a distribution of geopolitical awareness into 
aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts” (12). In 
other words, Orientalism was able to penetrate academic scholarships in the West and 
create a falsified understanding of the region. Hence, the widespread production of these 
academic and scientific scholarships- that are intertwined in the binary of the inferior 
East versus the superior West- gave authority and credibility to the knowledge produced 
by Orientalists. Said argues that Orientalism: 
Is a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases, to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is manifestly different (or 
alternative and novel) world; it is…produced and exists in an uneven 
exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange 
with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power 
intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or 
anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power culture (as with 
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orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas 
about what ‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand as ‘we’ do). 
(12)  
 
Additionally, Said develops his critical theory of Orientalism into two main 
frameworks; “latent Orientalism” and “manifest Orientalism” (206). By latent 
Orientalism, Said refers to the invisible and incognizant awareness process through which 
the West constructed the East in a xenophobic and prejudiced pattern. That is to say, 
latent Orientalism is based on unconscious inherent attitudes towards the Middle East 
rather than a product of a political intention to represent the Middle East (Said). 
However, when it comes to the other form of Orientalism, which is the manifest one, 
there is a conscious process of regulating knowledge and images about the East to 
constitute its “deviance” as a true reality in a formal body of academic and artistic works, 
from written to performed ones (Said). Therefore, due to the institutionalization of the 
manifest form of Orientalism, latent Orientalism was able to survive in the mindsets of a 
lot of people reinforcing a legacy of misrepresentation and distorts information vis-à-vis 
Arab and Muslim subjectivities (Said 206-210). Therefore, it is important to make clear 
connection between how the persistence of Orientalism has strengthened the prejudiced 
understandings and colonial approaches towards the Middle East, and how it has invaded 
contemporary societies and misinterpreted current events; such as the “Arab Spring.” 
According to Said, those approaches are the root of Western misunderstanding of the 
Middle East and should be reevaluated and deconstructed.  
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Twentieth Century Orientalism  
According to Edward Said, the difference between European Orientalism and the 
U.S. American one is that European empires had a longer legacy with holding colonies in 
the Orient, long-standing relationship, and an imperial role. Thus, there is a historical 
concrete experience. In the case of the U.S. Americans, there was a much less direct 
contact (until the war in Iraq). Hence, originally the U.S. American Orientalism was 
mainly based on abstractions. Initially the Orient was viewed to be an uncivilized and 
non-dangerous distant place (Said; McAlister). Said argues that the U.S. American 
Orientalism only became politicized at the beginning of the twentieth century as a 
response to the rise of “Islamic terrorism,” Arab opposition against Israel, and the Middle 
Eastern nations strategic role in the Cold War antagonist (as quoted in McAlister). These 
political events have dramatically changed the way the Middle East is perceived by U.S. 
Americans and made it into “a post-modern antagonist” (McAlister). Specifically, by the 
presence of Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the region, which created a misinformed 
representation of the issue, and established the whole Arab world as the enemy relying on 
Orientalist framings of the region. Moreover, Said recognizes that the Arab struggle for 
national independence is looked up with great hostility, in the West, that is upsetting to 
the stability of the status quo. Said claims that, this whole situation, makes it virtually 
impossible for a U.S. American to see on television, to read in books, to see in films, an 
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image about the Middle East that it is not colored by the political issues, where Arabs are 
always played as irrational and terrorists (Said).  
Hence, due the increase political interests and events in the Middle East and North 
Africa, several academics and analysts resumed the study and full examination of the 
region. One of the important and influential works that assesses the rise of this “neo” 
Orientalism in recent years is the critical book called Epic Encounters by Melanie 
McAlister. The differences between Said and McAlister works, is that Said examines the 
distinctive route of U.S. Orientalism in a post-World War II era and academics engaged 
in constructing the “Other” in the framework of the political scene of the Cold War, while 
McAlister’s book analyses the social and the political phenomena, which made the 
MENA region highly important and politicized to U.S. Americans and how they inform 
and construct their own understanding of patriotism. In McAlister’s words, Epic 
Encounters:  
Chronicles how, in the years between World War II and the run of the 
twenty-first century, U.S. Americans engaged in the Middle East, both 
literally and metaphorically, through its history as a sacred place and its 
continuing reality as a place of secular political conflict.  (McAlister 1)   
 
McAlister analyzes the national and cultural impacts of the Cold War and U.S. 
Americans’ reactions to bodies of Muslims, Arabs, and region of the Middle East. 
McAlister advances the idea that the Middle East is central in contracting not only a 
political reality of the United States, but also a cultural souvenir that U.S. Americans use 
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to define themselves spiritually, morally, and culturally. McAlister’s argument is based 
on two primary foundations. First, the United States’ foreign involvement in the Middle 
East has significant cultural meaning to U.S. citizens (McAlister 5). Second, that 
“Understanding the political import of culture requires that we position cultural texts in 
history, active producers of meaning, rather than assuming that they merely ‘reflect’ or 
‘reproduce’ some preexisting social reality” (McAlister 5). Hence, through the 
establishment of  “moral boundaries” between civilized/barbaric, liberator/terrorist, and 
good/evil, U.S. citizens are able to construct a universal understanding of the Middle 
East, as well as themselves (McAlister). Thus, U.S. American identity within this period 
was established with significant dependency to the conflict with the Middle East.  
U.S. American Orientalism and the Media 
Building on his influential work in Orientalism, Edward Said discusses the 
presence of Orientalism in the U.S. American media in Covering Islam: How the Media 
and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. Said applies his 
assessment of the liaison between authority and knowledge to the U.S. American media, 
and advances that idea that the media is comparable to the late Orientalist scholars of 
Europe, as a means that possess authority over knowledge production and its circulation. 
Particularly, media institutions hold two powerful components of impact over its 
consumers; first of all, the content transmitted through the media is perceived to be an 
absolute representation of  “reality,” and the “truth” to be believed (Said). Additionally, 
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the mass media outlets have the ability to influence the public agenda by choosing which 
depiction of the Middle East to broadcast (Said). As a result, the biased positionality of 
the mass media outlets and their power to produce information have essentialized Arab 
and Muslims subjectivities within U.S. public discourses, and outlined a distorts image of 
what the Middle East is. Consequently, the human side of the Islamic and Arabic world is 
rarely to be found, and the net result is a vacancy on the one hand, and the automatic 
images of terror and violence (Said).  
Orientalism, then, is about the manufacture of the other and this other brings convenience 
to oneself and is mainly done for purposes of domination.  
According to Said, the Iranian Revolution, for instance, in 1978/79 and the 
increase of terrorism against the United States forced Americans to “rediscover” the 
Middle East. Direct assaults against the United States and its international interests gave 
U.S. Americans no choice but to address the Middle East as region of substance and 
consequences. This rediscovery meant abandoning the traditional Orientalist perspective 
of the East as distant and exotic fantasy (Said). Now, the “Orient” could directly affect, 
influence, and confront nations of the world. The circumstances resulted in the 
mainstream media addressing the Middle East as a region of conflict. Hence, this 
historical discussion of the development of Orientalism is crucial in answering how U.S. 




Finally, I argue that Said’s critical theory has been highly influential in 
postcolonial studies, critical cultural studies and other fields. Hence, any discussion of 
Western perceptions or research of Eastern societies is incomplete without reference to 
Said’s work. It is because of this importance that I situate and contextualize my study 
within the legacy of Edward Said’s Orientalism. Said’s Orientalism serves several 
functions for my project on the “Arab Spring.” First, Said demanded a new approach, 
both historically and intellectually, towards the study of the Middle East and North Afria. 
In terms of scholarship, academics have produced a large amount of literature in this 
context, and it is my ambition to survey and optimistically add to the current academic 
discourse surrounding the MENA region and its subjectivities. Second, the central thesis 
of Orientalism is that the West has a faltered and dichotomous perception of the Middle 
East and North Africa, which is influenced by various social, cultural, and political 
factors that deserve an in-depth examination. Building on this frame, I support Said’s 
urgency to embrace a new approach to studying the Middle East in order to offer new 
readings of the “Arab Spring.” 
Colonial/Orientalist Feminism  
As I advanced in the previous section, U.S. feminist movements have focused on 
explaining the roles of Arab women in the uprisings and have described the revolts as 
either “gender-emancipatory” or “gender-subordinating” (Al-Ali; Mansfield; Cole and 
Cole). The main framing of the “Arab Spring” has been interpreted through the inquiry of 
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either the “Arab Spring” is “good” or “bad” for Arab women. Here, I argue that the 
liberal deployment of a rhetoric that conflates Arab and Muslim womanhood with 
victimization, positions the mainstream “U.S. American” feminist as the feminist subject 
par excellence. This interpretive lens of the “Arab Spring,” first, conveys a deemed 
antonymic relationship between “Muslim,” “Arab” and “Feminism.” It also 
communicates the resurgence of the popular Orientalist and stereotypical racial 
discourses on Arab and Muslim subjectivities. Hence, this intersection of Orientalism 
with Eurocentric imperialistic feminism traces the historical legacy of the Orientalist 
version of Arab and Muslim women and reifies certain events: in this case, the “Arab 
Spring,” as the central generator of “activism and/or oppression.” Therefore, in order to 
understand the reasoning behind the use of those Orientalist tropes by feminists, it is 
relevant to cover the literature on colonial/Orientalist feminism that has “shaped” the 
Arab, Muslim and feminism as oxymoron and non-existent. I also contend that 
colonial/Orientalist feminism disregards women’s agencies and creates a framework of 
U.S. “gender exceptionalism.” 
Defining Colonial/Orientalist Feminism 
Through Orientalist (Western researcher/travelers to the Middle East) discourses, 
Arab and Muslim women have been constructed as oppressed, docile, silenced, and 
dominated by their counterparts, the “Arab men.” Leila Ahmed, a Muslim feminist and a 
well-known researcher on Arab and Muslim women, has argued that, “[U.S] American 
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women ‘know’ that Muslim women are overwhelmingly oppressed without being able to 
define the specific content of that oppression” (522). She adds that, “these are ‘facts’ 
manufactured in Western culture, by the same men who have littered the culture with 
‘facts’ about Western women and how inferior and irrational they are” (Ahmed 522). 
Here, Leila Ahmed is referring to the roots of the stereotype of Arab and Muslim women 
in the early 19th century. In this respect, Leila Ahmed provides the example of Lord 
Cromer, the British consul general in early 20th Century Egypt. He famously 
appropriated feminist arguments to supposedly save Egyptian women by unveiling them, 
while he himself opposed the suffragette movement and political enfranchisement of 
British women in his own home country (Ahmed). In other words, for these European 
male travelers, the Orient is its women and the women are the focal point of this male 
vision of the East (Ahmed). This tendency of studying the Orient mainly through its 
women has also seen a revival during the current event of the “Arab Spring.” However, 
those accepted narratives by mainstream U.S. feminists on Arab and Muslim women are 
fundamentally problematic as they support an epistemological and political domination of 
men’s produced knowledge and history (Ahmed). They represent “a tokenistic apology 
that leaves uninterrogated a west/Islam binary” (Puar 7). According to Leila Ahmed, this 
rhetoric continues a long tradition of what she calls “colonial feminism” or the feminism 
“used against cultures in the service of colonialism” (151). Colonial campaigns against 
the veil and other “uncivilized” practices used a form of feminism to depict colonized 
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societies as backward, oppressive, and colonized women as victims in need of Western 
salvation (Abu-Lughod). Hence, colonialist or Orientalist feminism is a discursive 
strategy that appropriates feminist concepts for the purpose of domination not liberation.  
The “eventness” of the “Arab Spring” has revitalized this form of feminism, 
which deploys powerful Orientalist tropes to justify war and aggressive nationalism. It 
has made Muslim and Arab women “visible” in the mainstream discourses. However, it 
is a dismissive and destroyed visibility. This visibility of Arab women’s bodies due to 
“conflicts” could also be associated with the recent discourses on “the war on terror.” For 
instance, under the Bush administration, the war on terror and the fight for women’s 
rights became almost synonymous. In her famous radio address, Laura Bush conflated the 
two most explicitly, saying, “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and 
dignity of women” (Abu-Lughod). Protecting the rights of women became the most 
politically powerful rationale for invading Afghanistan. This resurgence of the 
victimization discourses as a justification of the military intervention in Afghanistan to 
save Muslim women employs the same logic and obscures endemic sexism within the 
U.S. (Jarmakani 159). The U.S. military intervention has little to do with actual concern 
for Muslim women’s well-being; rather Bush’s neocolonial rhetoric about Islam’s 
inferiority employs the century old Orientalist trope that uses the status of women in 
Muslim societies as justification for political domination and intervention in the Middle 
East (Abu-Lughod). The U.S. mainstream focus on Muslim women is usually limited to 
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concerns and debates about burkas and veils (e.g. Afghan women), but overlooks the 
much more complex web of immediate and more urgent economic, political and social 
challenges Arab and Muslim women face. Further, this partial view obscures the role of 
U.S. foreign policy, specifically during the cold war, in co-creating misogynist regimes as 
the Taliban and the Mubarak regime. Moreover, the moral juncture of women’s rights 
and imperialism divides the world in an easy grid of good and evil (Puar 52; McAlister 
282). Building on these insights, McAlister argues that 9/11 and the succeeding moment 
of trauma in the U.S. enabled “a national amnesia” and a new narrative about the 
essentially “good” and benevolent nature of U.S. imperial power, manifest in the 
“popular” phrase “Why do they hate us?” that effaces a long historic involvement of the 
U.S. in the Middle East (282). With the changing power structures after decolonization 
and the current neoliberal trends in economic globalization that create new classes of 
global citizens while degrading undesired humans to bare lives (Mbembe 12), 
“populations are rendered vulnerable to processes of death and devaluation over and 
against other populations, in ways that palimpsestically register older modalities of 
racialized death but also exceed them” (Kyungwon and Ferguson 2). While the effects of 
this neoliberal and neoimperial politics affect many people differently according to class 
and other “assets” that might provide them with what Aihwa Ong has called “graduated 
sovereignty and flexible citizenship,” Mbembe (12) lays out how the U.S. politics of a 
suspended state of emergency after 9/11 opened the gates for a wholesale perception of 
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Muslim citizens as potential terrorists. These perceptions “palimpsestically” (Kyungwon 
and Ferguson) registers over Orientalist renderings of Muslim men as “feminized, 
inferior and queer”; who at the same time barbarically oppress Muslim women, which in 
my view serves as a screen for Western men to project and fantasize about 
“unrestrained,” patriarchal masculinity (Mbembe; Puar). More interestingly, U.S. 
feminist approval and appraisal of Bush’s rhetoric and its neoliberal trends on women’s 
rights, increased the misrepresentation and symbolic violence done to Muslim and Arab 
women. 
Building on these points, I suggest that Orientalist feminism maintains two main 
ideologies that could be identified in what Jasbir Puar calls “U.S. gender 
exceptionalism,” as well as the appropriation of execution of aggressive nationalist 
practices (under a feminist rhetoric). First, Jasbir Puar defines gender exceptionalism as 
“a missionary discourse to rescue Muslim women from their oppressive males” (5). She 
argues that this gender exceptionalism proposes that “in contrast to women in the United 
States, Muslim women are, at the end of the day, unsavable” (5). This rhetoric of gender 
exceptionalism locates the U.S. as the democratic empire and overlooks the U.S. abuses, 
violence and policing of gender, racial and sexual formations (Puar). It also denies Arab 
and Muslim women’s agency and places them as victims in need of salvation.  In Puar’s 
words, such discourses “Posit America as the arbiter of appropriate ethics, human rights, 
and democratic behavior while exempting itself without hesitation from such 
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universalizing mandates” (8). More importantly, the lack of interrogation of the 
consolidation of mainstream (white) U.S. feminism along with nationalistic and 
imperialistic agendas -or what I have referred to as “femininationalism”- is problematic 
and dangerous. First, it denies women’s agency and sees women only as passive victims 
in need of salvation, rather than as active political agents. For instance, in the case of 
Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, media coverage focused on the role of Feminist 
Majority Foundation (a U.S. based group) in “freeing Afghan women” and the 
organization was praised for its efforts (6). However, the media ignored the role of 
Afghan women acting on their own behalf, despite the fact that well-established women’s 
groups like the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) has 
been active in speaking out -for decades- against oppressive laws in the country and 
against Western policies that damage women’s livelihoods and communities (Puar 6). 
Puar reports that the appropriation and the erasure of the works of RAWA by the 
Feminist Majority Foundation was abusive and describes the foundation as a “hegemonic, 
U.S. centric, ego driven, corporate feminism” (Puar 6). Hence, the implication of this 
Orientalist/exceptional feminism is that it maintains that the solution to women’s 
problems must come from the outside (mainly Western intervention). Another vital 
implication of this Orientalist feminism is the misreading of women’s concerns and 
demands. For instance, U.S. (white) feminists’ preoccupation with the veiling and 
unveiling of women does not reflect what Muslim women consider to be the most 
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pressing issues. As Suha Sabbagh confirms, “No Arab woman I know recognizes herself 
in it” (xi). This misreading of Arab and Muslim women’s rights advances the idea that 
inequality is merely cultural, ignoring works on intersectionality and identity politics. 
The assumption that women’s mistreatment is first and foremost grounded in an 
essentialized, monolithic Islamic or Arabic culture fails to recognize the plurality of 
gender regimes that co-exist with Islamic and Arabic cultures, and the broader social and 
political factors shaping gender arrangements in Muslim and Arabic societies (Mikdashi). 
Furthermore, the “Muslim” woman as victim storyline is a clear example of the perceived 
opposition of feminism and multiculturalism that has marked the dominant U.S. 
discourse about Muslim womanhood. Leti Volpp argues, “To posit feminism and 
multiculturalism as oppositional is to assume that minority women are victims of their 
cultures” (1185). This argument opposes race to gender and provides a theoretical basis 
for Orientalist/ nationalistic feminism, because it renders certain cultures or religions as 
inherently violent against women, while turning a blind eye to Western culture’s 
oppression of women. Hence, it suggests that women will be better off without their 
respective cultures, which not only obscures the agency of women within patriarchal 
societies, but also condones and even encourages U.S. violent interventions to “save 
brown women.” This view of women representing the fixed essence of women’s culture, 




Hence, I suggest that colonial/Orientalist feminism misreads and misrepresents Arab and 
Muslim women and makes their visibility docile. 
To summarize, in this chapter, I discussed how soon after the “Arab Spring” the 
U.S. public discourse framed the revolutions through Islamophobia logics and Orientalist 
tropes that reinforced the legacies of Orientalism. However, those discourses tend to 
ignore movements that operate from the bottom up, from civil societies to the state 
(Adib-Moghhaddam; Al-Ali; Matar). The revolts have shown that stereotypical 
representations of Arabs and Muslims and that Orientalists depictions of them as the 
different “Other” are outdated and of questionable ideological values (Adib-
Moghhaddam).  More importantly, the revolts denounce discourses that pronounce the 
unity and singularity of Islam. It also contests the dichotomous logic of “us” versus 
“them,” which demonizes the revolutions and flattens the complex realities of the “Arab 
Spring” and its subjectivities. Therefore, in this chapter, I called for a new reading of the 
“Arab Spring” to understand the multiplicities of the event, to challenge the Euro-
Americo-centric legacies of Orientalism in the Western academia and popular culture, 







CHAPTER TWO: THEORIZING THROUGH THE FLESH  
Theoretical Overview 
To study the complexity of the “Arab Spring” and “its women4,” I draw on 
theories of women of color to demonstrate how they forge new understanding of the body 
and subjectivity. Then, I theorize Muslim feminism as an example of a movement that 
embarks upon new spaces to understand the multiplicity and specificity of subjectivities 
within Muslim and Arab communities (rethinking feminism). I argue that Muslim 
feminism could be seen as an extension of theories of the flesh, where Muslim feminists 
theorize through their lived experiences and link the personal to the political. Through 
“fleshing” (Calafell), Muslim feminists reclaim their lived experiences and deconstruct 
the hegemonic universalist knowledge of feminism and struggle. They create a middle 
space “inbetween” the binaries to produce alternate discourses to challenge and disturb 
the knowledge, the representation and the discourse associated with them.  
Theories of the Flesh 
Feminist history, especially in the mainstream feminist movements, presents 
patriarchy as a system of oppression on its own and feminist movements as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is important to note that I am examining the “Arab Spring,” not only from women’s 
experiences, but rather -as I referred to earlier in the contextualization of my research 
project- as a study of the Arab revolutionary body within an assemblage of gender, race, 
religion, sexuality, and nationality. Bringing theories of the flesh, and Muslim feminism 
into the theoretical grounding of this research is thus crucial in understanding the 
importance of the body in the knowledge production of the uprisings. 
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independent system of liberation and emancipation. As Mohanty argues, “To define 
feminism purely in gendered terms assumes that our consciousness of being ‘women’ has 
nothing to do with race, class, nation or sexuality, just with gender” (55). In that sense, 
critical feminism as a social theory and as a movement cannot disregard the interlocking 
points of the systems of oppression such as nationalism, racism, classism and (hetero) 
sexism in order to question the relevance or usefulness of endeavors for liberation, 
emancipation or critiques to those systems (Puar). Furthermore, Chicana feminists have 
theorized a feminism that speaks to the needs of women of different backgrounds and 
struggles. The construction of “woman of color” feminism responds to the exclusion of 
women of color from white feminism, which claims to represent all women. In Norma 
Alarcón’s essay, “The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back and Anglo-
American Feminism,” she argues, “The fact that Anglo-feminism has appropriated the 
generic term [woman] for itself leaves many women in this country having to call herself 
otherwise, i.e., ‘woman if color,’ which is equally ‘meaningless’ without further 
specification” (147). Alarcón points to the way in which the term “woman” 
simultaneously fosters problematic man/woman gender binary, and subsumes racial 
difference. The term “women of color” is a political strategy used by marginalized 
identities to problematize fixed definitions and challenge the binary that fails to 
acknowledge interracial and intercultural interactions.  
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In the collection This Bridge Called My Back: Writings By Radical Women of 
Color, there is a demonstration of how bridging the diversity of genres is necessary to 
articulate that multiplicity of oppression that women of color experience (Anzaldúa and 
Moraga). It also reveals the divergent concerns between groups, as well as the disparate 
issues of women within the same community. Such contradictions and conflicts point to 
the impossibility of formulating a fixed definition for “women of color” or “Third World 
feminism.” In the introduction of the book, Anzaldúa and Moraga assert that Bridge is “a 
catalyst, not definitive statement of Third World feminism in the U.S” (Anzaldúa and 
Moraga xxvi). They also make it clear that they do not intend to construct a fixed 
definition for  “woman of color” feminism, nor do they expect their readership to read 
their essays as the final word on new and improved feminism. Their model is therefore 
exceptionally effective as it promotes discussions rooted in tension and contradiction, and 
in turn it forces the readers and authors to confront and use conflict as a site for identity 
formation. Moraga and Anzaldúa ask people of color to examine the sources of 
knowledge and transform the process of theorizing. They challenge the traditional 
interpretations of knowledge and encourage people of color to shift the research lens to 
one that recognizes their own experiences. They suggest that this negotiation occurs 
through and within the women’s bodies, which are the main site of conflict and 
oppression. They outline a “theory of the flesh” in order to convey the significance of the 
individual female body who is confronting those challenges.  Moraga and Anzaldúa state 
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that, “A theory of the flesh means one where physical realities of our lives-our skin color, 
the land or concrete we grew up on, our sexual longings-all fuse to create a politic born 
out of necessity” (23). The Chicana scholar and feminist, Bernadette Calafell frames 
theories of the flesh as “Ways of knowing that defy dominant logics, particularly those 
that emerge around constructions of Otherness” (267). In other words, those feminists of 
color theorize a strategy of resistance that centers women of color’s bodies because it 
simultaneously marks the site of women’s victimization, and the location where women 
must find their strength back. Hence, theorizing through lived experience is a space for 
reclaiming agency and deconstructing oppression (Moraga and Anzaldúa; Madison; Hill 
Collins; Calafell). Feminists of color encourage women of color to use their own voices 
to articulate their struggles; and in doing so, those feminists legitimate women of color’s 
voices and highlight the oppressions of women’s racialized and gendered bodies (Moraga 
and Anzaldúa; Madison; Hill Collins; Calafell). 
Women of color writers and feminists have fought structurally similar fights and 
used the transformative power of writing and theorizing through their bodies and lived 
experiences against the pervasive racist and sexist hierarchies in hegemonic culture that 
leave imprints on women of color’s selves. I extend this argument in the specific context 
of Muslim feminism that theorizes outside an Orientalist and patriarchal reference 
frames. I believe it is important to use revisionist models that rethink and rewrite the 
goals and strategies of feminist movements when new perspectives emerge. Finally, I 
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argue that Muslim feminism could be seen as an extension of theories of the flesh, where 
Muslim feminists establish a middle space “inbetween” the binaries to produce alternate 
discourses to challenge and hegemonic structures and discourses.  
In this chapter, I argue for the importance of theorizing through the body and 
lived experiences to challenge dominant binaries and produce alternative discourses. 
Also, Muslim feminism offers a new theoretical framework that speculates outside 
traditional frames. I believe that it is important to use these “new” revisionist models that 
rethink and rewrite the goals and strategies of feminists’ movements. These revisionists’ 
models also offer new readings of the “Arab Spring” that is not only reduced to the 
question of whether the “Arab Spring” is good or bad for women. Those models ask us to 












CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS CRITICAL VERNACULAR DISCOURSE  
	  
Methodological Rationale 
In my previous chapters, I situated my study in a growing field of work 
addressing the racialization and politicization of Muslims and Arabs in mainstream 
discourses. Through an analysis of Edward Said’s critical theory of Orientalism, I 
explored the long history of contextualizing, creating, and imagining the Middle East 
through a Western lens. In Orientalism, for instance, Said deconstructs the manifestations 
of the Westerner’s representation of the Middle that appeared in literature, history, and 
various cultural outlets. Contemporary postcolonial scholars have also analyzed images 
and misrepresentations of Arab and Muslims within different cultural artifacts. However, 
there is a little work done on how Arabs and Muslims are negotiating their identities vis-
à-vis these representations and what strategies they are using for empowerment and 
resistance. For those reasons, I argue for the use of a vernacular discourse perspective to 
look at the Other side of representations. Hence, through a review of literature on critical 
rhetoric and, more specifically, vernacular discourse, I illuminate how the vernacular 
functions not only in opposition but rather as a threat to hegemonic control as it is the 
means for expressing the multiple realities of people who use it. Therefore, I argue for the 
critique of vernacular discourse as a critical methodology to illustrate the hidden power 
dynamics and discursive strategies in order to illuminate how the vernacular is used to 
empower marginalized identities and further mobilize social change. Building on these 
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concepts, I contend that, by considering and analyzing the dynamic construction of 
discourses by those interpellated by them, we can better understand how marginalized 
communities construct an ontological status as a collective self through the 
comprehension of how they create varied subject positions. More specifically, for my 
analysis, I make a case for applying critical vernacular discourse analysis to the situation 
of Arabs and Muslims. I argue how the uprisings of Arabs and Muslims (with a focus on 
women) that took hold across the Arab world and the struggles that continue today don’t 
just undermine authoritarian regimes, they also unsettle mainstream representations of 
seemingly war-torn, sectarian, oppressed and repressed “Eastern” societies. Hence, 
through a critical vernacular discourse analysis of the different forms of the uprisings, I 
want to infuse a different kind of conversations in regards to the Middle East and “its 
women.” 
Critical Rhetoric: Overview 
One of the key significant areas of the study in communication is “critical 
rhetoric.”  In 1989, the critical rhetorician, Raymie McKerrow, advanced a theory of 
critical rhetoric to explore the dynamics of power in a particular rhetorical text, situation, 
or practice. McKerrow’s rhetorical theory emphasizes a critique of the question of power, 
which enacts two practices: the critique of domination and the critique of freedom. In the 
hands of a critical rhetorician, these critiques have the obligation (in a moral sense) to 
“Unmask or demystify the discourse of power” (91). After McKerrow’s first introduction 
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of critical rhetoric, several scholars have expanded on his theoretical perspective. A more 
recent and critical project in the communication field, which involves the study of critical 
rhetoric, is the analysis of vernacular discourse (Ono and Sloop; Holling and Calafell), 
which examines the daily interactions and discourse from within oppressed or 
marginalized communities. That is to say, critical rhetoricians analyze discourses in the 
context of the structures of power and knowledge located in larger discourses. A critique 
of vernacular discourse, then, offers the opportunity “To understand how a community is 
constructed and how that constructed community functions. . . . and to illustrate other 
possible realities, not to articulate a vernacular ‘space’ for further marginalization” (Ono 
and Sloop 26). Hence, for this methodological question, I begin with defining the 
foundations of critical rhetoric as a theory and a practice. Then, I present its critique by 
exploring vernacular discourse.  
A significant characteristic of critical rhetoric is the focus on praxis, which is the 
process by which a theory or a situation is put into action, practiced, or achieved. 
McKerrow then asks critical rhetoricians to consider critical rhetoric as an embodied 
practice, not just as a traditional method.  Therefore, McKerrow provides the rhetors with 
an orientation of placing theory into action rather than a methodology (450). That is to 
say, critical rhetoric is what we perform through our orientations to the world when we 
analyze texts. McKerrow furthers this definition by stating that,  
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Critical rhetoric seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power. The 
aim is to understand the integration of power/knowledge in society-what 
possibilities for change the integration invites or inhibits and what 
intervention strategies might be consider appropriate to effect social 
change. (91) 
 
In other words, McKerrow premise via critical rhetoric is a commitment to 
unmasking power dynamics that distort the critic’s understandings of a text, situation, or 
culture. This vision of criticism in this context is to unmask the mobilizations of 
discourse, which helps reinforcing dominant systems and their discursive functions of 
power. In other words, critical rhetoricians should employ the “skills of a rhetorician” to 
“invent texts suitable for criticism” (McGee 43). Hence, for McKerrow, critical rhetoric 
is a form of an ideological critique of discourse that requires a morally committed scholar 
and scholarship. Building on this point, critical rhetoric also highlights McGee’s 
argument that “Rhetors make discourse from scraps and pieces of evidence. Critical 
rhetoric does not begin with a finished text in need of interpretation; rather, texts are 
understood to be larger than the apparently finished discourse that presents itself as 
transparent” (278). McKerrow reaffirms McGee’s standpoint by contending that 
rhetorical criticism requires rhetorical critics to take a moral position vis-à-vis their 
scholarship. The call of critical rhetoric continues through a rhetorical analysis of power 
that is interested not only in means through which power dominates and represses, but 
also in how power can allow for a free space for its subjectivities. 
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Drawing on this, McKerrow develops that critical rhetoric is comprised of the 
paired critiques of domination and freedom. For McKerrow, “The critique of domination 
has an emancipatory purpose-a telos toward which it aims in the process of demystifying 
the conditions of domination” (91). The critique of domination refers to how criticism 
could be used as a countervailing force to domination and repression. It deconstructs the 
discursive functions of power and how they oppress the subjects. McKerrow asserts, 
“There is a compelling sense in which power is negative or repressive in delimiting the 
potential of the human subject” (92). That is to say, in the context of the critique of 
domination, the role of the rhetorical critic is to unveil the discourses of power that 
intersect to repress and control the people. While the critique of domination is considered 
to be a key element in social change, it alone does not add a groundbreaking and 
innovative approach to rhetorical criticism. However, the critique of freedom offers a 
significant addition to the practice of criticism. As borrowed from Foucault, McKerrow 
then explains the “critique of freedom” as a “Self-reflexive technique that turns its back 
on itself even as it promotes a realignment in the forces of power that construct social 
relations” (91). Hence, McKerrow assigns another critical role for rhetoricians, which 
incorporating the critique of freedom in their inquiry. More importantly, McKerrow 
advances that power is not always or exclusively oppressive. Power is also “productive” 
(McKerrow 98). Thus, the critique of freedom is the continuous critique of power as 
marginalized groups advocate for social power. As McKerrow explains, “Results are 
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never satisfying as the new social relations which emerge from a reaction to a critique are 
themselves simply new forms of power and hence subject to renewed skepticism” (446). 
Critical rhetoricians then are concerned with examining how new social power could 
guide to not only freedom but also domination. Finally, McKerrow outlines the 
“principles of praxis” (100). According to McKerrow, “The acceptance of a critical 
rhetoric is premised on the reversal of the phrase ‘public address’-we need to 
reconceptualize the endeavor to focus attention on that symbolism which addresses 
publics” (101). McKerrow’s vision of criticism is an ethical call for the rhetorical critic to 
be fully engaged in her/his praxis. McKerrow carefully avoids outlining to the critics 
traditional methodological means, and proposes instead an orientation of praxis that is 
committed to an engaged assessment and intervention.  
 Following McKerrow’s outline of the tenets of rhetorical criticism, Michael 
McGee expands rhetorical theory and its practice by merging materialist and symbolist 
perspectives to offer a theoretical model. According to McGee, to obtain a holistic 
understanding and analysis of a rhetorical situation, the critic should start by tracing the 
ideology in an “artifact.” McGee’s call for fragmentation of a discourse helps the critic to 
explore and expose the dominant ideology/ideologies embedded in an artifact. Embracing 
this ideological criticism urges the rhetorical critic to investigate, collect, and analyze a 
variety of rhetorical texts to fashion an analysis from “scraps and pieces of evidence” 
(McGee 76). This critical analogy is, specifically, applicable in the rhetorical productions 
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of contemporary uprisings of the “Arab Spring.” Within this framework, I argue that 
there is not a single homogenous, all-inclusive, universally supported “Arab Spring,” but 
instead there is a variety of movements and activities that occur across the Arab world 
(and I would argue globally as well) in the pursuit of political, economic and social 
equality. To expand more on the interplay of power and resistance, I elaborate more 
closely on the critique of domination and the critique of freedom as well as the tasks of 
critical rhetoricians within their practice. Between the two critiques and the principles of 
praxis, McKerrow has set out a list of tenets for critical rhetoricians to pursue a critique.  
Elaborating on Critique of Domination and the Critique of Freedom 
According to McKerrow, the critique of domination’s main role is to deconstruct 
and reveal how rhetorics of power and dominance “Create and sustain social practices 
with control” (92).  Understanding the power hidden in a rhetorical text or situation 
becomes the role of the critic. In other words, in the context of these rhetorical situations, 
the critical rhetorician looks at how discourse is being communicated by asking who 
dictates the following questions; who is allowed to speak? How much she/he could 
speak? On what issues and matters are they allowed to speak about? And when are they 
allowed to speak about those issues? Historically dominant systems and structures have 
implemented these questions into societies to control and dominate the rhetorical 
practices of the people. According to McKerrow, this practice of control by dominant 
classes over speech and action is called the “dialectic control” (McKerrow 95). Through 
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an analysis of the rhetorical situation, the critic could find the dialectic of control 
embedded in people’s discourses. Drawing on Foucault’s conceptualization of power, 
McKerrow maintains that the critique of the discursive function of power cannot be 
comprehensive due to the fact that domination is always fragmented. Hence, to pursue a 
critique of domination, McKerrow outlines three important tenets for rhetorical critics to 
follow. To begin with, McKerrow asks rhetoricians to gather the different ideological 
fragments found in a rhetorical situation, categorize them, and then examine them. 
Following this rhetorical orientation, the critic could expose ideologies, themes, artifacts, 
and ideographs that influence the way power operates as an oppressive force. The second 
guideline McKerrow offers to critics is to be aware of binaries and dichotomies that look 
at power is a very reductive fashion. In other words, power operates in a fluid manner 
that moves beyond the binary of loss/gain and functions with a matrix of forces (Foucault 
as qtd. in McKerrow 96). Hence, with this milieu of domination, power relations 
communicate unbalanced equality. This matrix of power is also applicable to the context 
of my scholarship, specifically, in terms of understanding Orientalism in a larger matrix 
of power.  
A final strategy for a critique of domination that I argue for is being aware of the 
fact that exploring domination is only a segment of the complex functions of power. For 
instance, if there is a critique of domination, the rhetorical critic could dismiss the 
chances that marginalized bodies could enact to “Varying degrees of power over others” 
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(McKerrow 96). This is also related to some of the critiques of Edward Said’s focus on 
critiquing mainly domination. McKerrow sustains that attention to domination is 
necessary but insufficient to fuel a nuanced critique of the flow of power. Hence, the 
critic must also be interested in the possibility of freedom, even in the face of illustrated 
oppression. The critique of freedom is the investigation of the constraints of power in our 
daily lives. In the words of Foucault, “The work of profound transformation can only be 
done in an atmosphere which is free and always agitated by permanent criticism” (as qtd. 
in McKerrow 96). In this way, the rhetorical critic is committed to a never-ending 
objective (or a telos). McKerrow argues that the nature of power and the perpetual 
creation of new social relations characterized through authority, mandate that the 
rhetorical critic never ceases to engage a in critical examination vis-à-vis those unequal 
relations of power. This ideological criticism hopes to create a social justice platform that 
is not dominated by the status quo to offer a new understanding or potentialities for 
“thought and action” that are not immersed in subjugation (McKerrow 96). Thus, I 
contend that understanding power as a three part relationship is essential. McKerrow 
suggests that the discursive functions of power emerge from the following dynamics: 
power, right, and truth. They dynamics are connected to one another making power and 
dominance appear to be natural, hegemonic, and comprehensive. Ultimately, McKerrow 
reminds critical rhetoricians to be mindful of the fact that there is no relationship or 
situation that is free from the discursive forces of power and domination. Finally, 
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McKerrow reconfigures criticism as a never-ending project that is always striving to 
challenge repression and domination; as well as holding the critics responsible for 
adhering to the ethics and responsibilities of ideological criticism.   
Critical Rhetoric as a Practice 
Within the context of critical rhetorical principles and terms of practice, the tenets 
that McKerrow outlines for critical rhetoricians received several criticisms. After this 
initial theorizing of critical rhetoric, a number of scholars, (see Ono and Sloop; Calafell; 
Holling and Calafell), were critical to McKerrow’s approach. Those critics advance that 
critical rhetoric is not complete as presented in 1989. Hence, several scholars have 
forwarded convincing criticisms of McKerrow. One of the key stands of that critique that 
I focus on elaborating in the next section is the critique of vernacular discourse.  
The Critique of Critical Rhetoric: Vernacular Discourse 
The rhetorical critics Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop argue for a turn towards, 
and call rhetoricians to focus on the rhetorics of the oppressed. Within this framework, I 
second their call to focus on vernacular discourse due the importance of the studying and 
examining discourses developed by marginalized groups. Through privileging the 
vernaculars of the oppressed, Ono and sloop suggest that split between everyday acts of 
activism and academic pursuit of criticism could finally collapse. According to Ono and 
Sloop critical rhetoricians: 
	  
47 
Cannot take the tools they have now and blithely apply them to the study 
of cultures. Rather, new methods, approaches, orientations, even attitudes, 
toward cultures need to be created. . . . critical rhetoric must be 
reconceived in light of the vernacular discourse that challenges approaches 
founded within Western notions of domination, freedom, and power. (40) 
 
In other words, the traditional theoretical and praxis of rhetoric focuses on 
dominant systems, structures, and classes, while neglecting the discursive forces of power 
that dismisses and erased the discourses and bodies of those in the margins. Hence, I 
reaffirm the call towards embracing vernacular discourse to unmask oppressive 
discourses for a turn to vernacular discourses to ensure the project of the critical 
rhetorician and adhere to the ethics of the praxis of ideological criticism. Furthermore, 
Ono and Sloop contend that vernacular discourse has two primary elements that could be 
examined: cultural syncretism and pastiche (21-25). These two characteristics of 
vernacular discourse are key to the construction and deconstruction of rhetorics. Their 
critical approach to rhetorical theory and praxis attempts to destabilize the subject 
position of the community of vernacular users while also de-essentializing vernacular 
discourses on “freedom” for instance, as the main artifact of marginalized bodies and 
voices (26). In doing so, Ono and Sloop demonstrate how vernacular discourse is a fluid 
process that is changeable and adaptable to the everyday lives of the people it is used by. 
Vernacular discourse could operate in a way where it affirms the identities of the 
marginalized communities, and another way where it represses the discourse of the 
people while supporting hegemonic Therefore, the usage and the fluidity of vernacular 
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discourse allow for a rhetorical praxis that is adaptive to the rhetorical situation or context 
it is applied to. Ono and Sloop advance that vernacular discourse is important as it could 
be used, sometimes, a counter-hegemonic and resistive of dominant systems and 
affirmative of oppressed voices (23). Ono and Sloop terms this discursive function of the 
vernacular as cultural syncretism.  Cultural syncretism is a characteristic of vernacular 
discourse that is does not only contradict dominant ideology, but also expressive of 
vernacular beliefs and the cultures it expresses. According to Ono and Sloop, vernacular 
discourse  “Affirms various cultural expressions while at the same time protests against 
the dominant cultural ideology” (20).   Hence, this process of the vernacular discourse 
demonstrates how its discursive aspects are always in negotiation and development. In 
other words, the dynamics of vernacular discourse reveal how the focus of analysis is 
shifted towards the cultural productions of marginalized identities, as well as how they 
embrace dominant ideologies and resist them. It is also concerned with how identities are 
constructed in the reactive process of the vernacular.  
Ono and Sloop also highlight the second function of vernacular discourse, which 
they term as pastiche. Pastiche has the tendency to use fragments and artifacts from 
popular culture to produce create new effects and meanings (23). According to Ono and 
Sloop, “Pastiche implies that vernacular discourse may borrow from, without mimicking 
popular culture” (23). In other words, pastiche is a dynamic and inventive process that 
takes elements from popular culture, which enables vernacular communities to establish 
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their own identities cultures outside hegemonic ideologies and systems. Hence, through 
the use of vernacular discourse a “Unique discursive form out of the cultural fragments 
by a concern for local conditions and social problems” (Ono and Sloop 23). However, 
because of the nature of borrowing, Ono and Sloop argue that aspects of dominant 
discourses and culture could be found in the vernacular discourses of the oppressed. 
Paradoxically, Ono and Sloop minimize the role of popular culture to vernacular 
discourse by failing to acknowledge how popular culture employs the vernacular for its 
revitalizing drive.     
Bernadette M. Calafell and Fernando P. Delgado, in “Reading Latina/o Images: 
Interrogating Americanos,” fill in the gap of Ono and Sloop’s work by exploring the 
vernacular material culture. Calafell and Delgado analyze Other rhetorical forms to 
demonstrate how the visual, for instance, plays an important role in discussing Latina/o 
identities. By deconstructing images and texts of Americanos, Calafell and Delgado 
establish “The power of the visual to serve as a vernacular discourse” (5) and “Explore 
the ways in which visual images provide arguments and counterarguments to ideologies 
or public memories concerning Latina/os in the US” (17). Hence, this analysis of 
Americanos enhances our understanding of marginalized bodies and the complexity of 
their identities, vis-à-vis their own communities and the dominant culture, through the 




Furthermore, in her book, Latina/o Communication Studies: Theorizing 
Performance, Bernadette M. Calafell, problematizes hegemonic theoretical and 
methodological approaches that analyze Latina@ communication studies by proposing an 
embodied/performative critical rhetoric. Calafell expands Ono and Sloop’s critique by 
locating the counter-hegemonic, affirmative and community-centered characteristics of 
the vernacular discourse within other forms of knowledge production that are not merely 
textual. On exposing other forms of knowledge, Calafell states: 
This vernacular discourse does not divorce language or words from their 
embodied nature.... My desire in using this method is to highlight certain 
meaning and rhythms in language and the choice of words while 
privileging the importance of orality in historically marginalized cultures. 
(20-21) 
 
Hence, Calafell’s rhetorical-performative perspective advances the argument that critics 
should pay attention to rhetorical discourses that are not merely textual but also visual, 
verbal and performative in order to understand how history, power, and social location 
have shaped the form of discourses produced by and manifested within Latina@ 
communities.  
Moreover, in Somos de una Voz?: Latina/o Discourse in Vernacular Spaces, 
Holling and Calafell further Calafell’s  argument by theorizing a Latin@ vernacular 
discourse. They define this discourse “As an encompassing, though not subsuming, 
metatheory for critically examining the everyday sites in which Latin@s struggle over, 
produce, engage, enact and/or perform culture, identities and community formation” 
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(Holling and Calafell 20). In other words, Latina/o vernacular discourse moves away 
from the opposition between media and audience and towards the discursive strategies 
employed by members of marginalized groups as participants in discourse, not to be 
simply described but to be critically analyzed in the context of the structures of power 
and knowledge located in larger discourses. Furthermore, Holling and Calafell develop 
three primary characteristics that are necessary in understanding the complexity of 
Latina/o vernacular discourse, which are: “tensions of identity, a decolonial aim, and the 
critic/al role” (21). Hence, Holling and Calafell draw the connection between the 
theoretical and performative as well as the role of self-reflexivity in regards to vernacular 
discourse. In “Rhetorics of Possibility,” Calafell contends that the rhetorical tradition is 
established on a writing of rhetorical criticism that eradicates marginalized voices (32). 
She furthers that point by stating that the shortcomings of traditional rhetoric are based 
mainly on “The norm of the field for the critic’s voice or illusion to selfhood to be 
relatively absent and criticism disembodied” (35). In other words, Calafell argues that 
traditional rhetoric dismisses questions of subjectivity or positionality both 
methodologically and aesthetically (36). Hence, Calafell confirms the importance of 
those rhetorical characteristics by asking the critics to remember that,  
If we are going to reach the texts produced by historically marginalized 
communities, we must meet these texts on their own terms 
methodologically. We must understand that they may not take traditional 




Furthering this point, Calafell and McIntosh argue for analyzing the connections 
between Performance Studies and Rhetoric. They invite scholars to examine “how the 
bodies of people of color are always informed and already ‘counter’ to dominant 
ideologies that govern the public sphere” (27). By articulating the body “as/is rhetorica/l” 
(6), they bring to our attention the importance of studying the ignored and  “Too often the 
mundane, everyday, acts of survival, resistance” (2), which are important in 
understanding how people of color use these strategies –in both the public and private 
spheres- to resist oppression and produce empowering spaces.  
In the context of my study on the “Arab Spring,” this demand is relevant as it 
gives me as a critic the ability to analyze how Arab women and men produce vernacular 
discourses in different rhetorical forms of knowledge. Hence, I contend that this line of 
research offers significant potential for locating new potentialities with regard to 
discursive contestation. Drawing on Latina@ vernacular discourse, I locate an 
epistemological space that argue for the examination of discourses produced by members 
of marginalized communities, during the “Arab Spring,” in order to understand their 
perspectives that have largely been foreclosed in traditional cultural studies research. 
Conclusion 
This methodological chapter explores the foundations of critical rhetoric as a 
theory and a practice and argues for a turn towards a critical vernacular discourse. It links 
ontology and epistemology, arguing for the importance of examining different artifacts 
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produced by marginalized groups. It also articulates the recent analytical framework for 
analyzing the construction and positioning of marginalized identities. Finally, by offering 
a review of Latina/o vernacular discourse, I can now locate a way of studying and 
theorizing the dialectic between agency and the subjects by looking at how the larger 
dominant structures are reproduced and contested through these discourses as well as 



























Operationalization of the Analysis 
The study of the discursive functions of a rhetorical situations as they relate to and 
interact with hegemonic systems to empower and disempower various individuals and 
communities-has been a crucial development in Communication Studies to understand 
and analyze how subjects and subject positions are produced and reproduced as well as 
the extent to which subjects can and do challenge and re-articulate their identity positions 
within ideological systems. In this study, following the tradition of Latin@ vernacular 
discourse, and within the context of the “Arab Spring,” I argue for an Arab vernacular 
discourse that is “An encompassing, though not subsuming, meta theory for critically 
examining the everyday sites in which Latin@s [and I add Arab] struggle over, produce, 
engage, enact and/or perform culture, identities and community formation” (Holling and 
Calafell 20). Under this construction, I consider Arab vernacular discourse as a rhetorical 
space produced to negotiate acts of resistance and “tensions of identity” (Holling and 
Calafell 21). That is to say, analyzing Arab vernacular discourse is valuable in providing 
a “new” and more complex understanding of those subjectivities. As I mentioned earlier 
in this study, soon after the “birth” of the Arab Spring, academics, media experts framed 
the “Arab Spring” mainly through an Orientalist lens that characterized the Arab Spring 
as either emancipatory or subordinating (Adib-Moghhaddam; Al-Ali; Matar). In other 
words, the critics of the Arab Spring explained the uprisings mainly through a critique of 
domination. However, focusing mainly on the critique of domination does not provide a 
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holistic understanding of the rhetorical situation. For instance, McKerrow warns critics 
not to understand the world in simplistic either/or notions of power. Consequently, the 
practice of rhetorical criticism would not be valid if its underlining assumption is that in 
order for one community/collective/subject to gain domination, another 
community/collective/subject must lose authority, instead, the Foucauldian power is 
considered to be active and dynamic moving in a matrix of domination (Foucault as qtd. 
in McKerrow 96). In a matrix of power, power relations are co-built and linked to one 
another, privileging inequality and injustice (McKerrow). In other words, traditional 
practices of rhetorical theory and practice assume hegemonic accounts of power relations, 
which automatically dismisses the bodies and voices and unheard and repressed 
communities. Hence, I argue as critic of vernacular discourse, I read the “Arab Spring” in 
a polysemic way, thus fulfilling arrangements of critical praxis. 
Furthermore, following the call for embodied/performative critical rhetoric 
(Calafell) to analyze vernacular discourses, I engage a critical analysis of rhetorical 
discourses of the “Arab Spring” that are not merely textual but also visual, verbal and 
performative in order to understand how history, power, and social locations have shaped 
the form of discourses produced by and manifested within the Arab revolutionists. By 
examining a series of the protests of the “Arab Spring,” I unveil how the “Arab Spring” -
visually, verbally, and perfomatively- “invent” (Calafell and Delgado) both the Arab 
subject and collective. Furthermore, drawing on theories of the flesh and the importance 
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of acknowledging the body and lived experiences in understanding subjectivities, I 
consider the Arab revolutionary body as a political vehicle that was used during the 
“Arab Spring” brings to the forefront issues of agency, identity and representation that 
have been merely discussed in dichotomous ways in the media as well as academia (see 
also Matar). Notably, this emphasis on the embodied experience allows for reclaiming 
agency and representation outside the usage of the outdated Orientalist tropes, and 
relocated issues of domination, oppression, and misrepresentation. This analysis will also 
answer questions about the nature of Arab cultural production, liberalism, and 
representation. 
To perform the analysis, I look at the different events that marked the “Arab 
Spring,” from the graffiti in the streets, to the deployment of the revolutionary language, 
to the act of self-immolation. For instance, I begin my analysis by looking at the self-
immolation of a fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi (Al-Ali). A policewoman 
physically abused the young man and his products were confiscated. To protest the 
physical and material abuse, Bouazizi set himself on fire (Al-Ali). Within weeks, what 
had begun as a spark with this Tunisian vendor became what is now called the Arab 
Spring (Al-Ali). Bouzizi’s act of self-immolation has been debated as the action that 
“created” the “Arab Spring.” Hence, this rhetorical situation calls for a nuanced 
understanding of issues of history, power, social location and calls for the practice of 
polysemic interpretations of rhetoric to avoid linear and “colonial” conclusions of 
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causality.  As a critic, I also argue that rhetorical artifacts alone cannot provide me with a 
comprehensive understanding of this situation and I should employ a level of 
fragmentation (McGee). Hence, I analyze the self-immolation, the revolutionary 
language, and the graffiti by analyzing different characteristics of vernacular discourse 
from cultural syncretism to pastiche. 
Finally, as a critic, I understand that the flow of power could reside in the position 
of me as the critic (Ono and Sloop). Hence, moving as a critic outside of my confines as a 
“reporter” is a crucial to the practice of criticism from a “we” stand instead of the 
“Othering” they (Ono and Sloop). Calafell also confirms this point by stating criticism 
cannot be “disembodied” and that the critic should address questions of subjectivity or 
positionality (based on Latina/o Communication Studies: Theorizing Performance and 
“Rhetorics of Possibility”). As far as my positionality is concerned, I acknowledge the 
tensions that could manifest within this rhetorical situation as I am both the critic and a 
member of the studied community (Calafell and Holling). Hence, I maintain throughout 
my study a commitment to self-reflexivity to analyze the complexities of representations, 
voice and the body.   
Data Collection 
Vernacular discourse is considered to a praxis and model for locating the rhetorics 
of the people in their respective communities, as well as an examination of how certain 
discursive models are represented and constructed. Moreover, the turn towards vernacular 
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discourse privileges the neglected everyday talks and spaces of normal citizens over 
hegemonic systems and sites. Hence, for this dissertation project, I focus on vernacular 
discourse gathered in Tunisia using ethnographic methods of data collection, which are 
rhetorically analyzed to discuss the tropes and tools used in sense-making processes that 
will be evoked by participants/revolutionists in and about the “Arab Spring.” 
Specifically, vernacular discourse included in this analysis consists of discourses that 
emerged during from my field notes, rhetorical display or performance observed and/or 
experienced during participant observation, and data from photographic and video 
recordings that were collected over a 40-hour period during a two-week visit to Tunisia, 
in August-September 2013.  
More specifically, I apply a combined methodological approach, which I refer to 
as Vernacular Ethnography, as a novel approach to studying rhetoric “in the field.” Texts 
and performances are rhetorically analyzed, utilizing vernacular discourse analysis as an 
emergent methodological tool, to discuss potential consequences of privileging the 
revolutionary body in sense-making processes about the “Arab Spring.” This reading 
offers a polysemic study that fulfills arrangements of critical praxis. The relationship 
among rhetoric, bodies, space, and power is also discussed as a way to propose 
integrating critical inquiry into rhetoric of events so that consequences for investigating 
and understanding how larger systems of power could be addressed. By investigating the 
way that messages are interpreted in Tunisia, rhetoric and ethnography can be combined 
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to more intricately study vernacular discourse in the field. Therefore, by combining 
traditional methodological approaches, I seek to open rhetorical and ethnographic 
methodologies to each other. This combination has the potential to provide new insights 
into the complexities of discourse, more generally, and rhetoric, more specifically. In 
order to effectively study vernacular discourse “in the field,” the integration of text 
(verbal, visual, performative) and context provides new possibilities that expand the 
availability of and access to vernacular discourse for scholarly analysis. By combining 
participant-observation and rhetorical analysis approaches to collecting and analyzing 
data, the sense-making processes people evoke in making a particular place and event (in 
this case Tunisia) meaningful can be investigated more organically (as they are 
experienced and observed) and holistically (as one way of sense-making among many 
and in relation to a larger sense of the world beyond one particular place). In this 
approach, performances of vernacular discourse can be viewed as complex and 
significantly related to enactments and effects of power. Through collecting and 
analyzing data in multiple ways-through ethnographic and rhetorical methods-the 
complexities and relationships among vernacular discourse, place, space, and power is 
then addressed in new ways and discussed as having a wide-range of implications. 
According to Denzin and Lincoln, a qualitative researcher is comparable to a 
bricoleur (6), similar to the analogy that Calafell and Delgado make describing the work 
of a critical rhetorician (see also Holling and Calafell; Calafell). They discuss the analogy 
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in terms of a researcher bringing together pieces of information as a way to classify 
images and text into a coherent and larger tableau. Hence, the researcher has the ability to 
create methods and tools that could facilitate the process of assemblages and bridging 
everything together. That is to say, ethnography is a useful methodology in this project as 
it enable my study of Arab vernacular discourse, in specific as: (1) it is constant and 
involved, (2) it is microscopic and holistic, and (3) it is flexible and self-corrective (Eder 
and Corsaro 521). More importantly, ethnography as a methodology maintains the 
longevity of research and brings attention to the importance of fully embodying the 
specificities of the study rather than only generalizing from the outside. Specifically, I 
spent two weeks in Tunisia, spending every day participating in and observing the events 
that occur both formally and on an everyday basis. These events include participating in 
protests; listening to chants; watching performances; taking pictures, eating my breakfast 
and lunch with everyday citizens; writing in my journal; talking to whomever sits near 
me; people-watching; and even joining a tour group. I participated in every opportunity I 
came across during my two-week visit. I attended every major event in the main streets of 
Tunisia, and spent time involving myself with the everyday activities. I also observed 
others in the main revolutionary space of Avenue Lhbib Bourgiba, Tunis, while partaking 
in as much as possible. I talked to all of the different types of people I observed. I also to 
talk to a variety of races, genders, ages, and roles of people present in the streets 
demonstrations, coffee shops, and so on. Additionally, through informal interactions, I 
	  
61 
gathered people’s reflections of the revolutionary after they engaged in particular 
activities that perform a relation to and/or symbolic interpretation of the “Arab Spring.” 
This allowed me to treat the sense-making processes that the participants revealed in their 
vernacular discourse about the revolutions as both performative and descriptive. 
Vernacular discourse, in this way, is both particular to the Tunisian and Tunisians, in the 
way it allowed for unique, individual sense-making processes as well as commonly 
evoked and collectively negotiated in the way it engages or dismisses alternative sense-
making processes about the space and the event more generally. In this way, I was able to 
conduct a sustained study for two weeks, and an engaged study by participating in as 
much and with as many people as possible. 
Moreover, in order to investigate the central components of vernacular discourse 
of the revolutionary body, I analyze how vernacular discourse functions, as it emerges in 
the symbolic representations, performance, and/or recordings of movement collected at 
the public spaces of Tunisia. I also extend this discussion to address how such a 
framework can also interrogate enactments of power and resistance, such as when one 
party overtly displays authority over another or when one person’s interpretation of the 
space/or the revolution is usurped by another’s. During my ethnographic study, I also 
examined how Tunisians employ discourse in an effort to evoke an ideal representation 
or response and also how lived experiences are particularly evoked. Finally, I examine 
how participants’ vernacular discourse reflects an ongoing process of sense-making that 
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positions themselves in the world in different ways-particularly how evocations of place 
and event help them discuss who they are and how they interact with others in the square 
differently than elsewhere.  
To sum up, I incorporated ethnography in my research for several reasons. First, 
ethnography focuses on reflexivity. By this, I mean that the researcher must be reflective 
about her/his position in the research as a way of substantiating the interpretations and 
findings that lead to more general truth claims. In other words, all knowledge is 
perspectival and must be articulated as such. In this study, my own experiences in Tunisia 
are an integral part of the data I present. The people I noticed, the relationships I 
encountered, and the functions I observed are all reflexively discussed as connecting my 
own experiences to the data. This helps the participants-and myself-to collectively 
negotiate particular meanings of the “Arab Spring” as a space and event. Hence, this 
project attempts to incorporate me, as a researcher, into the construction and 
interpretation of vernacular discourse, treating my own experiences and interpretations as 
an integral part of the world that I study. Rather than identifying texts and analyzing them 
as part of a larger, abstract social world, ethnography and vernacular discourse analysis 
allowed me to immerse myself in the production of these texts as a way of connecting my 
own personal experience and perspective to participants’ construction and interpretation 
of the “Arab Spring” as an event in my analysis. Second, ethnography is concerned with 
validity. By this, I mean, “The method investigates what it intended to” (Kvale 302). In 
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other words, the way that our understanding of the world is constructed defines whether it 
is valid to others (and perhaps even to our self). In this case, I gathered data in the form 
of vernacular discourse as both identifiable texts and contextually situated events that are 
able to be experienced collectively as they emerge. The ability for data to be collected in 
a way in which it can be identified as a rhetorical text and also as an event that can be 
reflexively presented required a praxis of ethnographic methods of data collection. In this 
way, an ethnographic methodology enables the collection of vernacular discourse to 
simultaneously maintain both textual and contextual elements as integral aspects of its 
nature; it allowed me, as a researcher, to gather data in a way that did not force 
privileging one element over another in the data collection process. Third, ethnographic 
data collection should focus on the details of a specific situation, but in a way that helps 
to elucidate a larger situation of which they are a part. This study focuses on the way in 
which vernacular discourse in and about the “Arab Spring” is produced and how rhetoric 
is understood to be part of larger sense-making processes about the revolutions. 
Therefore, in accordance with these main reasons to use ethnography, gathering 
vernacular discourse benefited from ethnographic methods to offer a complete study of 






CHAPTER FOUR: THE VERNACULAR DISCOURSE OF THE “ARAB SPRING:”  
 
FROM THE VISUAL, THE EMBODIED, TO THE TEXTUAL 
 
Narrating the Rhetorical Body 
Avenue Hbib Bourgiba in Tunis is the central boulevard that has encompassed the 
country’s main transformations from French colonialism, to a coup, and finally an 
uprising. It is the space where thousands of Tunisians gathered in their pursuit of 
independence. After weeks of demonstrations across the country in 2011, Tunisians 
headed to Avenue Habib Bourguiba and demanded the former president Ben Ali to leave 
the government. Hence, Avenue Habib Bourguiba became the stage for Tunisia’s politics 
and never-ending protests, projecting both the hopes and anxieties of a people bracing for 
change. This is the space where a young man set himself on fire screaming out that 
unemployment, and humiliation had forced him to put an end to his life. Hence, the Arab 
uprisings have changed cities like Tunis, turning the avenues, squares and traffic circles 
where protesters marched and died into hallowed spaces. In the early afternoon, as I cross 
into Avenue Habib Bourguiba with my mother, we witness how the street is guarded by 
riot police officers from the old theater down to the clock tower in the circle. At first, the 
police let people gather, and soon they fill the avenue. You see a full crowd of movement 
and life, which reflects the cautious hope of Tunisia’s transition. Some of the bars and 
coffee shops stay open even with the flow of demonstrators. The atmosphere is amazing. 
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Soon after we enter the space, I see my mother joining the movement of street 
demonstrators and repeating after them the following lines: 
If one day a people desires to live, 
Then fate will answer their call. 
And their night will then begin to fade 
And their chains break and fall. 
At first, seeing my mother joining the protesters, I was petrified. The thought of 
losing my mother to the brutal police force in Tunis while I was collecting my data for 
my research was terrifying.  As I approached my mother to displace her from the crowd, 
she shouted at me saying, “These are my people, this is my cause, and ‘The will to live’ 
has been our anthem for years.” My mother’s words reminded me that even with the 
geographical shifting from Morocco to Tunisia, the discursive identity of an Arab or a 
North African (or more specifically a Maghrebi: who are citizens of Morocco, Algeria 
and Morocco that share geographical borders and a history of French colonialism) 
community was carried along. The opening lines of the poem “The will to live” to the 
Tunisian poet Abu Al Kacem Chebbi, have been on the tip of millions of tongues since 
1930s, they have been taught in schools from Morocco to Bahrain, sung by influential 
Arab stars, shouted by protesters against French and British colonizers, and written on 
protest banners.  I remember singing “The will to live” when I was a kid with my mother 
in front of the Ministry of Education in Rabat, Morocco, demanding an educational 
	  
66 
reform and a better treatment of teachers across the country. Hence, my mother was right, 
even if people’s experiences across the region are different and diverse, the demands for 
dignity, equity, and equality echoed a sense of commonality and familiarity among the 
people. In the middle of the demonstration, next to my mother, I could feel a strong bond 
between the people, which is what giving the movement its momentum. The space of 
Avenue Habib Bourgiba offered my mother and I a narrative of  “possible realities” (Ono 
and Sloop 26), which affirmed our sense of a pan-Maghrebi5 /pan-Arab community that 
is living a collective experience of coming together with the aim of interrogating power 
and power relations with its ruling regimes. We could finally witness and live the 
manifestation of a poem that ends in a massive street demonstration. My mother’s 
participation in the protest is also a manifestation of “fleshing;” of women theorizing 
through lived experience in a public space where they are reclaiming agency and 
deconstructing oppression (Calafell; Moraga and Anzaldúa; Madison; Hill Collins). In 
that setting, my mother used her own voice to articulate a collective struggle and join the 
demonstrators. Through fleshing, my mother’s body communicates her voice as a 
protestor, as well as her voice as a veiled Muslim woman speaking against essentialism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Maghrebi people include Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans, and Mauritanians 
(Moors is also used as an alternative descriptive terminology of the inhabitants of the 
region). Maghrebis are largely composed of Berber and Arab descent with European and 
Sub-Saharan African elements. Brunel, Claire and Gary Clyde Hufbauer. Maghreb 




of the Muslimness. Her body “increasingly occupying a middle ground where the secular 
and religious meet or where the two collapse” (Badran, “Islamic Feminism: What’s in a 
Name?”). In this demonstration, my mother is critiquing the injustices produced by an 
Islamic government, while simultaneously disrupting the understanding of (Western) 
feminist ideals and pointing to the Orientalist values and images which consider Islam 
misogynist by the mere occupation of her veiled body Avenue Habib Bourgiba. Her body 
then is a showcase of how Muslim feminism could transcend local oppression and 
Orientalist representations, and is an example of a middle space where Muslim women 
reclaim a discursive space beyond the binaries.  
However, as protesters scaled the Interior Ministry’s walls in the middle of 
Avenue Habib Bourguiba, the police started asking people to disperse and threatened to 
begin using violence to break up the gathering.  Out of fear that the police would start 
firing tear gas onto the avenue, my mother and I left the space taking with us an 
embodied experience of hope and resistance. As we move away from the avenue, we can 
still see the police chasing protesters down side streets. This scene of police brutality 
recalled the protests that my mother experienced growing up in Morocco. I feel my 
mother’s body still shivering from leaving the avenue that abruptly, but I can still hear 
her voice whispering the lines of  “The will to live:”  
If one day a people desires to live, 
Then fate will answer their call. 
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And their night will then begin to fade 
And their chains break and fall. 
As I hold her hand, I become aware of how complex, liminal, and difficult the 
space and the bodies we just embraced, it is not a mere protest, it is indeed an uprising 
that has always been becoming. 
Being together with my mother, sharing that moment with her, encountering those 
diverse bodies and listening to their voices, established the first praxis of a revolution, 
which consist of listening and collaborating. To establish this praxis, D. Soyini Madison 
elaborates: 
Before a performative politics of effective dialogue can begin, the ethics 
of first being fully present with another requires this deep paying 
attention…To “be with” is to be present, not in the Derridean metaphysics 
of presence as pre-representational or as an absolute origin, but as an 
“epiphenomenon of representation”: in a body-to-body convergence that 
pays attention to the right now and is newly comprised by all the 
representations, histories, and longs that came before this moment to make 
the  now more extraordinary. These extraordinary “now moments” 
flourish through radical listening, demanding we pay attention to the 
collaborations and motions that generate our being together and what we 
can make together. You are intellectually, relationally, and emotionally 
invested in an Other’s symbol-making practices and traditions as you 
experience with them a range of yearnings and desires. In the face of those 
who say “it will never change,” these human rights activists begin by 
paying attention and listening. On the ethical ground of being together 
with another and sincere listening, one may gain the invitation to speak 
and the trust to be heard. Then a conversation is possible that can lead to 




Hence, this establishes how sites of performance and performative bodies cohere 
in the service of rights, justice, and activism through being attentive and collaborative.  
Making Sense of the Rhetorical Body. My mother’s body as a veiled Muslim woman, her 
voice that conveys a pan-Maghrebi identity, and her public political performance in 
Avenue Lhbib Bourgiba communicate a complex discursive and embodied multiplicity 
that refuse the binary of looking of at conflicts/revolutions from a “gender-emancipatory 
discourses” versus “gender-subordinate,” and reinforces the arguments that the 
experiences of women in the “Arab Spring” were -and still are- significantly more 
diverse, both in terms of the day-to-day-life and in terms of political significance. First, 
my mother’s performance rejects the premise of colonial/Orientalist feminism, which 
misreads and misrepresents Arab and Muslim women and makes their visibility docile. It 
moves beyond the rhetorical assumption that portrays “Muslim” woman as victim 
narratives in need of salvation, and reclaims women’s agencies and acts of activism. It 
also reinforces the idea that interpretive lenses that study the “Arab Spring” from 
Orientalist and stereotypical racial discourses. 
Second, my mother’s embodied act of resistance is a display of Muslim feminism. 
It refutes the deemed antonymic relationship between “Muslim,” “Arab” and 
“Feminism.” Calafell and McIntosh argue that “Vernacular discourse is grounded in the 
material reality of bodies, that ‘everyday’ rhetorics contrasts dominant-hegemonic 
discourse simply by its material differences from it” (4).  Hence, my mother’s 
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performance is counter-hegemonic as it defies the deployment of Muslim and feminism 
as oxymoron and non-existent, and communicating a movement that embarks upon new 
spaces to understand the multiplicity and specificity of subjectivities within Muslim and 
Arab communities. My mother’s embodied performance demonstrates the importance of 
looking at the “Arab Spring” as a middle ground where possible alliances between 
difference and diverse bodies-from secular to conservative, from men to women, from 
Tunisian to Maghrebi- are formed in their efforts for equality. The “Arab Spring,” is 
indeed a space where multiple and different identities of Muslimhood in terms of 
ethnicity, politics and histories can come together in order to claim “Simultaneous and 
sometimes contradictory allegiances even as they resist globalization, local nationalisms, 
Islamization, and the pervasive patriarchal system” (Cooke 94). 
To deconstruct the vernacular discourses experienced in Tunisia, I specifically 
selected graffiti, chants and the act of self-immolation in Tunisia for close rhetorical 
analysis. Employing the synthesized concept of embodied vernacular discourse, my 
analysis attempts to examine how the selected graffiti, chants, and body rhetorically 
constructed a Tunisian/ Tunisian- Arab community by addressing the following 
questions. How did they challenge dominant ideologies while simultaneously affirm their 
own rhetoric (“cultural syncretism”)? How did they borrow from the language from the 
mainstream in order to challenge it (“pastiche”)? How did different -personal and 
institutional agencies- help to shape or constrain their discourses? How did they construct 
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their subjectivities? However, prior to offering a close analysis of the vernacular 
discourses of the uprising, I provide a general analytical overview of the movement from 
its situationality to the outcome. 
An Analytical Overview of the Situational 
The act of self-immolation of Mohamed Bouzizi in Tunisia sparked the uprisings 
around the Arab world, which started an incredible movement of dynamism, self-
expression, activism, revolutions, uprisings, and all different kinds of activities that 
continue to shape the Arab world. The Arab uprising is consistently changing and it has a 
wide variety of different manifestations, and different conditions in different countries. 
There is no single “Arab Spring,” there is no single Arab revolution or movement, there 
is a wide variety of citizen dynamism and activism, expressing grievances and 
complaints, and aspiring to a better world.  As the Arab States, in this case Tunisia, are in 
the process of nation state building, it is important to explore the work of Benedict 
Anderson to discuss how nationalism and the concept of community formation are 
constituted in the “Arab Spring.”  
In his book, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Anderson examines the way communities were created by the growth of the 
nation-state, the interaction between capitalism and printing, and the birth of vernacular 
languages-of-state. Anderson defines the nation as an “Imagined political community that 
is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (7). Hence, this could be reflected 
	  
72 
in the Arab Uprisings, as it created a constitutive, imagined community based on 
common demands for equal rights and against dictatorships through the re-birth of the 
vernacular. It is imagined because “Members . . . will never know most of their fellow 
members . . . yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6). This 
could be seen in the street protests, where demonstrators do not know one another, and 
yet are gathered together for a common cause. On the other hand, Anderson asserts that 
the possession of citizenship in a “nation” allows and stimulates the individual to imagine 
the borders of a nation, even though such borders may not physically exist. However, in 
the project of the “Arab Spring,” this understanding of a fixed “nation” could be limiting, 
as the people see the movement of the uprisings in a very fluid, hybrid, and liminal 
spaces that is not controlled within a physical frontier. Anderson also contends that 
formation of a communal is restricted. It is restricted because “Even the largest of them . . 
. has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (7). That is to say, the 
fact that “nationalists” are able to envision borderlines implies that they understand the 
presence of division by culture, ethnicity, and social structure among people.  
Anderson also explains another essential quality of the nation, which is the 
sovereign. According to Anderson, a nation is also sovereign because:  
The concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution 
were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical 





  Hence, the sovereign state is a figurative representation of the autonomy from 
conventional religious institutions. It offers an awareness of social order that is necessary 
the sense of orderly civic society, without depending on the declining religious hierarchy. 
But on he other hand, when it comes to the most of the Arab nations, Anderson advances 
the argument that the downfall of religion in regards to sovereignty is what gave an 
upsurge to nationalism, conversely, religion “Defined and still defines the way of life of 
the inhabitants of Arab countries…and is reflected not just in government policies but in 
language and rituals” (Rafeedie, “Book Review”). In contrast to Anderson, Rafeedie 
asserts that while the nationnesses of other countries have “modern” origins, Arabness 
has possessed established linguistic, ethnic, and geographic unity for a much longer time. 
However, Anderson reminds us that the notion of a “nation” is built on the concept of a 
“community” due to his argument that the nation is “always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship” (7). Hence, even if there are disparities and injustice with a 
state, the imagined coalition among people of the same imagined state is solid and form 
to the chase it brings citizens together for heroic patriotic sacrifices in the names of their 
imagined nation. Therefore, this notion of building coalition through resistance and 
activism in the course of establishing “a political community” has been manifested 
through the Arab uprisings, which created a collective political consciousness. For 
instance, the practice of chants, graffiti, and other forms of resistance facilitated the 
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imagining of a “community,” a “political community,” and the rising of a “communal” or 
collective consciousness of a “nation.”  
Moreover, the expansion of the poetic protests contributed to the 
vernacularization of languages and spaces. The chanted couplet-slogans for example- that 
were constructed through the deployment of language- established unified fields of 
communication, which enabled demonstrators from multiple backgrounds and identities 
to become aware of one another via the oral and the visual. In the case of my mother, for 
instance, she became aware of other protesters in Avenue Lhbib Borugiba via the use of 
poems, even if she is geographically from a different region. Therefore, my mother and 
the rest of the demonstrators, consequently, became aware of the existence of the millions 
who share not only their “nation,” but also their language of resistance. Similar to how 
Anderson framed that print-capitalism facilitated the imagining of a nation. Social media 
in the case of the Arab world, for instance, expanded the language, and therefore the 
cause, which enhanced the feeling of “nationalism” or collectivism.  
To elaborate more on Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, I want to 
expand its understanding and connect it to a more fluid conceptualization of a 
community, such as the “multitude” by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. I argue that the 
Arab uprising as a fluid movement constitutes an imagined community through the 
multitude, rather than nationalism per say. Hardt and Negri define the multitude as a 
leaderless coalition of horizontal structure. The movement of the multitude is difficult for 
	  
75 
states to contain; criminalizing those who do not abide by their boundaries is the most 
states in control can do. This flow of the multitude helps create their political power, 
“Empire must restrict and isolate the spatial movements of the multitude to stop them 
from gaining political legitimacy” (Hardt and Negri, Empire 397). Hence, a “collective 
existence”
 
of the multitude is important to further its political demands (Hardt and Negri, 
Empire 401). 
The multitude utilizes actions such as self-immolation, protests, chants and social 
media as a democratic use of violence to combat political, social and economic injustices. 
The “Arab Spring” initiated this democratic use of violence to support its leaderless 
organizational structure. Therefore, the overthrow of the governments is only the 
beginning; this multitude is demanding ultimately full democracies. The organization of 
these uprisings concurs with Anderson’s conceptualization of “imagined communities,” 
as well as Hardt and Negri’s definition of the multitude as a leaderless coalition of 
horizontal structure. If leadership were to enter into the realm of the uprising, it would 
undermine its power and force it to become a traditional organization. However, this is 
not traditional; it is politically new. The leaderless resistance must be constituent to the 
demands to encompass the needs of the entire population. It is weapons such as self-
immolation, protests, chants and graffiti that allow the leaderless organization structure to 
succeed, constitutional recognition of freedom of expression “represented by the common 
experiences of network relations” (Hardt and Negri, “Arabs are Democracy’s New 
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Pioneers”). The convenient utility of those weapons allow the multitude to exemplify the 
power that resides upon them and opens up discussions and frustrations to further 
intensify the revolutions. These weapons not only mobilize the multitude but they also 
avoid direct surveillance from the government and cross class lines to allow more 
individuality to join. The embracement of pluralism within these uprisings captures the 
essence that is the multitude. The multitude is empowered by the differences and fluidity 
that enter into it. The differences end up encompassing thoughts, strategies and 
motivations that have the ability to become transnational through the use of democratic 
tools to defy dictatorships.  
Therefore, citizens of the Arab world are striving for a better world that they want 
to create with their own hands, responding to their rights as citizens and human beings to 
be treated fairly by their own societies. However, the changes that are going on in the 
Arab region are very complex, varied, and changing fast, which makes it difficult to 
encompass all the details of the current situation or predict an accurate future of the Arab 
revolution. Rather, it is important to reflect on what happened in the last three years and 
think about what can be identified as new, significant, lasting, and what is just fleeting 
and temporary. Also, it is important to think about what has been achieved by the 
revolution and what is not, as well as what should be anticipated to happen in the future. 
However, the dilemma I faced in executing this analysis of the Arab uprising is that all 
the events that are happening are at the same time sequential, simultaneous and cyclical. 
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By sequential, I refer to fact that the sequence of events that are happening are never 
ending. For instance, every week, every month, there is something new (either positive or 
negative) that happens; a whole process of major historical development that keeps 
occurring in every country. By simultaneous, I refer to how the Arab countries are trying 
to do something new that no other country in the world has ever tried to do. Every single 
state of the twenty-two Arab countries is experiencing some level of activism, citizen 
expression, and demand from demonstrating in the streets to tweeting online. However, 
they are simultaneously trying to achieve what in Western countries, like the United 
States, was achieved over a period of 200 years from wars to revolutions to bringing 
forward new constitutions and granting equal rights to citizens. The implementation of a 
democratic system of governance in Western countries was indeed a long process that did 
not address all the issues of its societies at the same time. The difference in the Arab 
world is that Arab citizens are trying to solve all the issues they are facing at one time. It 
is very complex to simultaneously define the constitution, shape the nature of the political 
system, address the issue of minority rights, tackle the issue of religion pluralism, address 
the issue of national identity, national values, address the issue of civilian/military/police 
balance, address the issue of the role of women in society, address the issue of the 
relationship between the central government and the regional provinces; all these issues 
are being treated at the same time. The problem is that it is beyond human capacity to 
achieve satisfactory outcomes in all those areas at one and that fast. For instance, I found 
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out from the Tunisian people I talked to that if the government achieves some agreement 
on the role of Islam in the constitution for example, there will be a disagreement on the 
role of women in the constitution, or freedom of the press, or foreign aid… In other 
words, there is no linear breakthrough of the process that could be achieved. If we look at 
the case of Tunisia for example, first we have citizens’ revolts, then the overthrown of the 
president, then electing a new government, and then drafting the first democratic 
constitution all within a period of three years.  
Finally, by cyclical, I refer to how the progress of the revolution or post-
revolution is taking a step forward towards a democratic transition, and then a step 
backward towards the old authoritarian regime. In the case of Egypt, we can see how the 
people ended the authoritarian rule of the military, and then electing-democratically- the 
Muslim Brotherhood into the government, and then ousting of the democratically elected 
president, and returning to the military rule. Hence, the transition is indeed a cycle of 
achievements and failures.  
Hence, sequential, simultaneous and cyclical nature of these issues of nation-
building, state building, political definitions, national values, societal relationships, 






An Analytical Overview of the Outcome of the Uprising  
The Birth of the Arab citizen (citizen sovereignty)  
Walking through the Tunisian streets, witnessing demonstrations, observing the 
graffiti on walls, talking to the people, I could not help but notice the birth of the citizens 
and a citizenry. You have a citizenry in a country where people for the first time could act 
like citizens. They do not only feel that they have rights and express those sentiments, but 
they also feel that they have the capacity to bring about the implementation of these 
rights by creating a democratic political system. Hence, the birth of the citizens and the 
citizenry is a new and epic historical achievement that should be acknowledged and 
examined thoroughly to explore new possibilities. To examine closely the concept of 
citizenry in “Arab Spring,” I develop the idea that citizenship is performative.  
 Citizenship as Performative 
  Building on Judith Butler’s (1990) work on gender performativity, I argue that 
citizenship’s construction and performativity is similar to that of gender. First, Butler 
argues that gender (and “sex”) are constructed categories that attempt to make the world a 
simpler place by dividing persons into women and men (Butler, Gender Trouble). Similar 
to the case of Tunisia, the government divided society into two categories: citizens 
(mainly the elites with political, economic and social power) and non-citizens (the 
people). These categories then inform how each of us understands the world and our 
place within it. As such, these ideas act as unifying concepts that consolidate identity: 
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that is, being born a man or a woman gives us tools to determine who we are in a way 
that, for example, being left-handed does not (Butler). Comparable to that, being born a 
citizen or non-citizen could inform the subjectivities about their own identities and how 
they should enact them. Furthermore, gender operates as a norm that allows a person to 
be intelligible or recognizable as humans to others within society. Similar to the pre-Arab 
uprisings discourse, only citizens with power are considered humans and treated with 
dignity. For Butler, performativity occurs upon entering discourse (which coincides with 
coming into the social world). This argument develops the idea that citizenship is a 
similar, fundamental basis of identity that shares many of the characteristics of 
performativity that Butler discusses in reference to gender. Citizenship could be seen as 
analogous in its performativity to gender in several ways. Butler includes the idea of 
performativity as citationality, meaning that performative enactments of identity flow 
from a recognizable norm; performativity, in order to be understood, must “cite the 
conventions of authority” (Bodies That Matter 13-16). Thus, performativity means that 
agency is “located as a reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a 
relation of external opposition to power” (Bodies That Matter 15). The key to 
understanding performativity and the world we create through it is to begin to see power 
as it moves through us and as we act with prevailing norms or against them. Similar to 




While on the one hand, under the overarching rubric of performance, 
social behavior embodies certain repetitive norms (performativity) that re-
inscribe identity and belonging, thereby concretizing tradition, on the 
other hand social behavior also embodies behaviors that ‘do something’ 
(performative) to disrupt of interrupt these repetitions to open up 
possibilities for alternative actions and behaviors. (49)  
 
Performativity is not something one voluntarily chooses, but is the:  
Forced reiteration of norms. In this sense, then, it is not only that there are 
constraints to performativity; rather, constraint calls to be rethought as the 
very conditions of performativity [which cannot] be simply equated with  
performance.... constraint is...that which impels and sustains 
performativity” (Butler, Bodies That Matter 94-95).  
 
The goal then, is to challenge the constraints that make some bodies recognizable, 
while at the same time creating the subjugated whose lives are not recognizably human. 
This can be done, through subversion (Butler Gender trouble). This subversion is most 
evident in the ways in which some persons are not recognized as such by their failure to 
fit established categories of male or female (Butler). This could be seen through resistive 
vernacular discourses that shaped the Arab Uprisings. According to Madison,  
One performance may or may not change someone’s world, but as James 
Scott reminds us, acts of resistance amass rather like snowflakes on a 
steep mountainside and can set off an avalanche. Everyday forms of 
resistance give way to collective defiance. (159) 
 
Hence, those movements reclaimed the Arab citizenry by challenging the 
dominant ideologies. Butler claims that “‘becoming’ a gender is a laborious process of 




what one is already supposed to be reflects the language of the revolutionists who are 
“becoming” citizens, rather than consumers of the oppressive system through resistance.  
 The Birth of the Public Political Sphere 
These citizens are acting in a new public political sphere that they created. Prior 
to the uprisings, the modern Arab world never had a credible public political sphere; a 
public space in which people can debate freely and without censorship political issues 
through the media, political parties, demonstration, non-governmental organizations, 
open meetings, lectures to outline the way towards a democratic system that is diverse 
and balanced. So, the public political sphere has now been born. It’s still young and 
fragile, but it exists. In the case of Tunisia, you see people constantly going back to the 
streets manifesting their discontent with the existing political behavior of the groups in 
power, and expressing their desires of what they expect as their right as citizens. This 
repeated expression of citizen demands, expectations, and rights are taking a place in a 
public arena, in an open way and a legitimate way. This is new. Finally, in this public 
political sphere, citizens are debating and the defining what I see as the third critical 
element of the uprising, which is the creation of a new social contract. 
The Creation of a New Social Contract 
The creation of a new social contract in the Arab world is happening for the first 
time in the region, publically, democratically, constitutionally, pluralistically, peacefully 
in an open arena in which any citizen can make her/his voice heard. This is an 
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unprecedented action and has never been witnessed in the Arab world. According to the 
Tunisian people I talked to, the old social contract- or what they called the ruling 
bargain- existed between the regimes and the people, but the rules were written by the 
regimes. For instance, the regimes gave the people security, subsidized “bread,” and 
schools, in return, the people gave the regimes absolute loyalty and power. Essentially, 
this contract turned the Arab citizens into consumers. Their only role is to consume 
products generated by governments, giving up -unwillingly- their political rights. Hence, 
the old social contract was shaped and defined by the ruling political in power elites, with 
citizens having no say or contribution to it. This time, after the uprising, the new social 
contract is written by a combination of different people in society, including the people 
who are ruling from the top (military, Muslim brotherhood...), and ordinary citizens. 
Even if this new social contract is at its earlier stages of development, it is important to 
acknowledge the effectiveness of this process. This new social contract is also based on 
the principles of democratic pluralism and the rule of law, which are cherished values in 
the Arab countries that have not been clearly implemented or freely experienced. To 
achieve this democratic pluralistic system of governance, there should a constitution, 
written by the citizens, and approved and validated by its citizens. Hence, the people are 
still persistent in the streets because they want a written constitution that is credible, and 
responsive to the national consensus of the citizens.  This is what gave birth to the citizen 
sovereignty. That is to say, the concept of the sovereignty of the citizen is a new 
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operational term, in which the rule of the statehood, the exercise of power, the nature of 
the policies, and the quality of rights all drive their validity from the consent of the 
governed. Thus, if those governed write their own constitutions and implement them, 
they will give legitimacy to the public authority and the institutions of governance in 
power in the Arab region.  
Now, to see the manifestations of these embodied rhetorical changes in the 
uprisings, I examine how the selected graffiti, chants, and body rhetorically constructed a 
Tunisian/ Tunisian- Arab community by deconstructing how the revolutionists 
challenged dominant ideologies while simultaneously affirm their own and construct their 
subjectivities.  
The Visual Space of Tunis: Graffiti 
The most fascinating thing I saw in Tunisia was the range of graffiti scrawled 
across the walls, advertising billboards, street signs, flower pots, park benches and any 
other surface that allowed Tunisians to express their political sentiments. This captured 
for me the two most important historical developments that we can identify at the end of 
the third year of the ongoing Arab uprisings and transformations: first, the birth of Arab 
citizens who feel they have socio-economic and political rights and are prepared to speak 
out, mobilize and take action to achieve those rights; and, second, the birth of a public 
political sphere in which citizens can express themselves and compete peacefully for the 
exercise of power.  
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Citizens writing graffiti capture those two developments quite nicely, and the 
content of the graffiti is equally telling. The formal public space of Tunis (billboards, 
advertisement panels, newspapers and magazine covers on the sidewalks) was dominated 
by admonitions to vote “yes” to the referendum and support the interim government 
installed. The walls and other informal spaces reflected many more varied views, 
including the very common statement “ash-shab yurid isqat annitham” (the people want 
the downfall of the regime). Other graffiti called the current leader a killer, or warned that 
another revolution was imminent. Moreover, the use of language is important to note, but 
the actual variety of languages used is also significant. The graphic and stylistic methods 
of communicating, used in conjunction with various languages, are important structural 
and qualitative tools. They are used in conjunction with various languages. English was 
overwhelmingly used, but the non-English languages were significant to consider as this 
truly global conflict has political implications around the world.  For instance, the graffiti 
I photographed in Tunisia contained messages not only in the Tunisian dialect; but also in 
Arabic and French, which are considered to be native languages of the North-African 
region. The other language seen was mainly English. This English presence of graffiti 
was not surprising, especially given that English is seen to be the mainstream 
international language of expression, as well as a mean to seek international support and 
solidarity through messages. Hence, similar to Anderson’s argument that the creation of 
imagined communities became possible because of “print capitalism” (7). Capitalist 
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entrepreneurs printed their books and media in the vernacular (instead of exclusive script 
languages, such as Latin) in order to maximize circulation (Anderson 6-7). As a result, 
readers speaking various local dialects became able to understand each other, and a 
common discourse emerged. Therefore, the hybrid usage of languages in the graffiti in 
Tunisia facilitated the development and circulation of vernacular languages that 
reinforced a sense of nationality among the people. The hybridity of the graffiti created 
an imagined community based on a shared identity that brought together the personal and 
cultural feeling of belonging to the “nation.” Thus, the imagined citizen that the 
vernacular of the graffiti targeted was mainly the Tunisian, the North African who share a 
history of French colonialism and Arab influence that consequently influenced the 
vernacular expressed in the graffiti. However, the imagined community -through the use 
of the graffiti- could also form a global/borderless community seen as the multitude. The 
widespread of the graffiti into other states as well as over social media also created a 
collective existence of a community based on demands for social justice.  
As a response to the growth of the graffiti, the appointed government in Tunisia 
tried in places to paint over the graffiti but gave up after every wall it painted white was 
full of graffiti again 24 hours later (Ben Mhenni, “Graffiti in Tunisia”). So the new public 
political sphere that continues to experience its birth across Tunis lurches back and forth 
between popular sentiments that support and oppose all three principal actors who have 
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dominated the public power structure in the past few years-the old guards of the ex-
president Ben Ali, the police, and the Nahda Party (similar to the Muslim Brotherhood).  
The new element today that Tunisia still displays is that those who control the 
power structure do not totally control the public sphere, or the minds of all Tunisians. 
That is a meaningful milestone on this third year of the Tunisian and other Arab uprisings 
that cannot be denominated in seasons of the year, but rather only in the attitudes of 
individual citizens who are determined to express themselves politically and in public. 
In this section, I examine discourse within some of the graffiti in Tunisia to show 
how the “wall streets” constructed itself as a vernacular medium through which 
information about Tunisians/ and Arabs is articulated. Inscribing graffiti on the walls of 
Tunis became a visual and a verbal voice for the people. According to a Tunisian graffiti 
artist, Oussama Bouajila, who inscribed several slogans and paintings on the street of the 
capital, Tunis, says,  
We created this graffiti movement because no one speaks about us and the 
problems of unemployment, poverty and marginalization that we face. So, 
we have decided to speak for ourselves. Why graffiti? Graffiti is more 
accessible for the Tunisian [citizen] who does not have access to 
Facebook, for instance. (Mtiraoui, “Two Tunisian Graffiti Artists”) 
 
  Hence, the graffiti was transformed to a (trans)national news outlet for how these 





The Revolutionary Vernacular of the Graffiti  
The graffiti’s vernacular discourses are revolutionary in two ways. First, they 
helped create a new look for the Tunisian/ Arab community in the streets and mediated 
images (including domestic and internationals newspapers, Facebook, and Twitter). 
Second, the graffiti established a hybrid vernacular subjectivity by crossing the borders 
between nationality origins, race, religion, class and other social categories rhetorically. 
For instance, Tunisian street artists did not only use local revolutionary symbols, but also 
reused Western and Latin American 
revolutionary icons. 
The Tunisian protesters used 
rhetorical strategies including 
identification, satire, 
assemblages/mixing, and 
transculturalism as vehicles for content 
that was potentially critical of 
mainstream hegemonic discourse. 
Meanwhile, these rhetorical techniques 
helped establish their own vernacular 
rhetoric (“cultural syncretism”) and thus helped build a personal, creative, and liminal 
Tunisian/ Arab community in the streets.  
Fig. 1 Graffiti done by Zwewla  
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One of the first graffiti to be analyzed is one found in the walls of Sousse, central 
East Tunisia (Figure 1). The graffiti portrays a painting of an angry, desperate man in 
black and white, with a caption written in Arabic -in red and black- that reads “We, the 
employed and the unemployed, are against injustice and exploitation.” The graffiti is 
signed by the name “Zwewla.” The term Zwewla in Tunisian dialect means “the poor,” 
which refers to a street art community that is famous for its graffiti in support of the poor 
and marginalized groups in Tunisia (Ben Mhenni, “Graffiti in Tunisia”). In this graffiti, 
the group Zwewla used identification – or “one of us”- rhetoric to address issues about 
the Tunisian/ Arab community. Identification refers to the means by which an author may 
establish a shared sense of values, attitudes, and interests with his or her audience 
(Burke). The more likely an author can talk in the audience’s language through “speech, 
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying attitude, idea, identifying [his or 
her] ways with [the audience’s]” (55), the more effectively s/he can persuade the 
audience. Using the strategy of identification, the group Zwewla constructed their graffiti 
persona as a struggling working-class Tunisian/ Arab with whom their Arab audience 
could easily identify. Like many other graffiti, the “words” and “paintings” were ordinary 
and familiar. Set in an artistic demonstration in the walls and written in both Modern and 
colloquial Arabic, the group Zwewla treated their audience as their friends, and conversed 
about their ideas, feelings, and stories. The content of the graffiti addressed heavy and 
complex issues. The group Zwewla criticized the mainstream regimes’ mistreatment of 
Fig. 1 Graffiti done by Zweela 
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Tunisian and Arab citizens by drawing upon the popular image of how an “Arab” looks 
like and the use of the Arabic language.  
Challenging and Reconstructing Subjectivity 
In their graffiti, Zwewla sought to resonate with their Tunisian/ Arab audience by 
reminding them of their shared struggles and demands. The graffiti group frequently used 
the pronouns “we,” “our,” and “us” in Arabic to break the boundaries between 
themselves and their audience and construct themselves as a member of the community. 
By identifying with their audience, they voiced the outrage that the people ought to have-
one that should protest against the injustices exerted upon them by the authoritarian/elitist 
regimes in the region. However, the use of the modern Arabic language mixed with the 
Tunisian dialect in the written caption of the graffiti, as well as the employment of Arabic 
calligraphy in the drawing communicate a hybrid and embodied discursive space.  This 
vernacular discourse of this graffiti first speaks directly to the Tunisian and Maghrebi 
community as the written words “khadam w battal,” “we the employed and 
unemployed,” are written in Tunisian/ Maghrebi colloquial not in modern Arabic. Hence, 
the message is establishing an exclusive cultural identity of a shared 
Tunisianess/Maghrebiness through the use of a colloquial that could only be understood 
by this specific community, not all Arabs. There is an articulation of a discursive 
imagining of a community (Anderson) that is not Arab, or Western, but rather 
Tunisian/Maghrebi. Therefore, this message is both affirmative of the Tunisian/Maghrebi 
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identity and counter- hegemonic of the widely accepted notion of pan-Arab, or a unified 
identity. The fact that the text is written in Arabic letters, does not make it accessible to 
all Arabs, and refutes that hypothesis that all Arabs share a “one” Arab “Spring.”  
The second part of the text in the graffiti is written in modern Arabic, which reads 
“deda addulm wa istighlal,” “we against injustice and exploitation.” Unlike the first part 
of the caption of the graffiti, the vernacular discourse of this text is open to all Arabic 
speaking identities; it is not only open to Tunisians/Maghrebis, but also Arabs. Thus, this 
part of the text constructs a discursive pan-Arab unity that was not present in the first part 
of the text. It also communicates different meanings and resists the constructed 
understanding of Arabness. First, the issue of access to employment and social class are 
articulated as problems that Tunisians/Maghrebis are –specifically- suffering from; 
however, “injustice and exploitation” are issues that are shared among the Arab 
communities but under different circumstances and social categories. Second, it is 
important to note the diversity of what constructs Arabness and their issues are important 
rhetorical constructions that Zwewla established in the caption of this graffiti. Through 
the verbal fragments of the graffiti, the group Zwewla suggests the presence of hybrid, 
diverse, embodied Arab identities. Zwewla, as rhetors, employ hybridity as a political 
strategy to construct their subjectivities. In other words, through the deployment of 
different languages in their graffiti, Zwewla confirm that their identities are “A product of 
multiple cultures, having a tolerance for ambiguity” (Calafell and McIntosh 18).  
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According to Bhabha (1994), hybridity as a political strategy suggests a 
subjectivity that troubles the boundaries of social classifications and exerts its positive 
influence by dancing along the borders. They are engaging in border crossing, 
articulating variegated discourses that are composed of many overlapping forces beyond 
race and ethnicity. In other words, this nuanced articulation of demands in Arabic but 
through the usage of two different layers-Tunisian/Marghrebian dialect and modern 
Arabic- both affirms and resists simultaneously the notion of pan-Arab unity that is 
widely spread not only in the Middle East and North Africa, but also in the West. The 
new meaning the caption of this graffiti creates an affirmative shared Arabnesss, while at 
the same time rejects the non-polyvalent aspects attached to Arabness, and constructs an 
individual identity of being a Tunisian/Maghrebi. It is a borderless understanding of 
identity. I will unpack this notion of Arabness more in depth in later examples, but this 
concept asserts what Calafell and Delgado’s discussed in terms of the powerful abilities 
of visual arts, they affirm that:  
Art has the ability to communicate because it can collect images and 
artifacts of cultural and ideological resonance and reposition them within a 
given frame to echo long-held sentiments while articulating new 
meanings. (5, emphasis added) 
 
Hence, these Tunisian political artists employed rhetorical or discursive strategies 




Another frequently used technique in the graffiti is the deployment of assemblage 
or mixing, a type of “pastiche.” The group Zwewla mixed many fragments of the Western 
mainstream discourse to serve their own argument, particularly in the form of images in 
their graffiti. For instance, the drawing included in this graffiti is the popular Internet 
meme character “Trollface” or rage comic. Trollface is an Internet character/troll that was 
originated in the United Stated drawn by the artist Carlos Ramirez; it is a very simple 
black and white drawing, asymmetrical and with an enormous grin showing two 
enormous rows of teeth (Brad, “Trollface/Coolface/Problem?”). Due to the 
unattractiveness of the face, the meme is aptly named. Also, the face is known to appear 
in rage or sarcastic comics. Hence, the group Zwewla borrowed the American Trollface 
concept, and mixed it with Tunisian/Arab political affects.  The graffiti’s drawing 
portrays an angry, desperate trollface. The angry affect shown in the troll’s face is an 
articulation of the text, which communicates discontent and disappointment in a regime 
that let down its own citizens. Hence, the trollface is an affirmation of the Tunisian/Arab 
cultural identities expressing frustration and resistance. The angry face of the troll in this 
graffiti could also suggest that this is a counter-hegemonic message vis-à-vis the 
Orientalist trope that considers angriness as an Arabic trait.  Here, the anger and despair 
are contextualized in terms of a resistive movement against injustices and exploitation. 
As the analysis above suggests, Zwewla strategically used the “we/us” rhetoric, 
assembling/mixing, and satire to concurrently (dis)/identify with a Tunisian, Arab 
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community (ies) and –at the same time- challenge the mainstream discourse. 
Constructing a persona as an ordinary Tunisian/Arab citizen and talking in a personal 
manner, the group of artists turned this graffiti into a conversation in which they shared 
their personal feelings and demands with a community. This created a unique graffiti-
style vernacular rhetoric, which is very different from that of conventional speeches in 
which rhetors attempt to 
“educate” or “preach” to 
their audience. Moreover, 
the images drawn by 
these political artists by 
default served to create a 
new look for the 
Tunisian/Arab 
community. In 
challenging the preconceptions of the community prevalent in the mainstream media- 
angry without a cause, passive, supportive of dictatorship, and obedient- these Tunisian 
graffitists appeared to be expressive, and rebellious in a creative way. Hence, the graffiti 
is not only counter-hegemonic of the stereotypes of an “Arab” persona is the West, but 
also resistive of the “obedient” character that the ruling regimes of the Middle East and 
North Africa have established for years describing its citizens. Seen in this light, this 
Fig. 2 Graffiti done by Zwewla   
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graffiti does present a revolutionary call in how they simultaneously create vernacular 
discourses while contesting mainstream discourses. 
Another graffiti drawn by the group Zwewla that is worth examining is one that 
was created after the Tunisian revolution (Figure 2), where there was a rebirth within the 
Islamist political structure, as they became part of the government following the 
overthrow of former leader Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. I found this particular 
graffiti in the same area as the previous one in Sousse, central East of Tunisia. The 
graffiti portrays headshots- in black and white- of four personalities with names written 
in English in upper-cases under their faces. From left to right, the headshots include the 
following names: BELAID, CHAVEZ, BRAHMI, and MANDELA.  Over the faces of 
Belaid and Brahmi, you can see red ink spots over their faces, signifying blood shots that 
are also touching the heads of Chavez and Mandela. Finally, the graffiti is signed by the 
group’s name -Zwewla- in Arabic. Mohamed Brahmi and Chokri Belaid were both 
opposition leaders, and both were critical of the actions of the new Islamist party. Belaid 
and Brahimi were assassinated, which created a turmoil in the Tunisian political scene, 
and forced demonstrators to go back to occupy Avenue Habib Bourgiba (Gall, “Second 
Opposition Leader”). Also, both Belaid and Brahmi were considered to be symbols of the 
Tunisian revolution that ousted the dictator regime in Tunisia. Moreover, the presence of 
the headshots of Hugo Chavez and Nelson Mandela suggest that Zwewla embraced these 
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leaders as political symbols because-similar to the Tunisian graffitists- they fought 
against marginalization, oppression and suppressing the voice of the people.  
Hence, this second graffiti by Zwewla is producing culturally specific rhetoric 
within the Tunisian populations. First, the graffiti represents an affirming vernacular as it 
speaks to all the Tunisians who are resisting the new political assassinations and 
supportive of the oppositional leaders who were killed. The drawing is thus syncretic as it 
protests the mainstream discourse of the new oppressive government that is allowing 
political violence against the opposition, while simultaneously constructing its own 
community’s rhetoric to engage them.  
Moreover, the vernacular discourse in this graffiti is also constructed out of 
fragments of national and international cultures. The images of Latin-American and 
African revolutionaries and leaders and other elements from Western culture (the use of 
the English language) had been co-opted by those young Tunisian graffitists to express 
their discontent following the post-revolutionary political scene. The vernacular discourse 
constituted within this graffiti is a form of pastiche of cultures from different elements 
that have been taken from diverse context, and placed in the graffiti for the purpose of 
establishing new meanings and effects (Ono and Sloop 23). First, the graffiti could be 
accessible only to the Tunisian population. Non-Tunisians who are not familiar with the 
political leaders of Tunisia could misunderstand the placement of Chavez and Mandela in 
the graffiti. The graffiti in this instance represents what Ono and Sloop call “a broken 
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language [in this context there are images] [that] cannot be understood by the hegemonic 
culture and therefore functions syncretically, to affirm and protest, through a pastiche of 
other languages [in this example it is images]” (24). Zwewla are thus bringing together 
different cultures to create specific cultural expressions for their community. In regards to 
this fragmented strategy used by the graffitist to produce their art (“pastiche”), McGee 
affirms “Rhetors make discourses from scarps and pieces of evidence. Critical rhetoric 
does not begin with a finished text in need of interpretation; rather, texts are understood 
to be larger than the apparently finished discourse presents itself as transparent” (279). 
Hence, the members of the Zwewla used fragments of mainstream and diverse 
revolutionary images to construct their own subjectivities.  Their graffiti represents a 
transnational form of art where those graffitist, instead of rejecting the West, they’re 
embracing it through art and revolutionary symbols, but reinterpreting it to their specific 
histories and to match their needs. 
Deconstructing Arabness 
Tunisians/ Arabs represented through this graffiti constructed subjectivities by 
articulating a vernacular discourse that was beyond issues of nationality. For instance, the 
first graffiti exemplifies this hybrid and embodied subjectivity. In this graffiti, which 
combines Tunisian dialect and modern Arabic, brought to the forefront the diversity 
within “Arabness,” combating the misconceptions and biases against the notion of the 
“one” Arab identity, at least implicitly. Also, Zwewla’s artistic works demonstrate that 
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they, as Tunisians, are not limited to speaking only a Tunisian-specific vernacular 
discourse in the graffiti. Instead, they rhetorically worked with other vernacular 
communities and criticized the hegemonic discourse regarding class, nationality, and 
social oppression. They also tried to construct hybrid vernacular subjectivities in their 
graffiti by challenging racial and social essentialism, and rhetorically mobilizing a 
political mobility and solidarity. This also confirms how the “Arab Spring,” visually, 
verbally, and perfomatively- “invent” (Calafell and Delgado) both the Arab subject and 
collective. In my previous discussion of Orientalism, I mentioned how the Orient was 
essentially invented and constructed by Western empires in order to execute imperial 
ambitions and convey cultural superiority (Said), however, from the analysis of the 
graffiti, we can see how the group Zwewla are “re-inventing” the Orient, how the “Arab 
Spring” is producing knowledge of the Orient. There is agency vis-à-vis the construction 
of one’s identity, discourse, and space.  
In the next section, I analyze how the body was used in the revolution to contest 
oppression and build a community. 
Self-immolation/Bouzizi as an Embodied Symbol of the Revolution 
Mohamed Bouazizi is a symbol of the Dignity Revolution. Many Tunisians 
expressed how the 26 year-old fruit vendor was the catalyst of what they called the 
Dignity Revolution after his act of self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. Bouazizi’s 
sacrifice inspired many Tunisian protestors and online supporters, and within only 10 
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days of his suicide, the 24-year authoritarian regime led by the President Ben Ali was 
ousted. 
Mohamed Bouazizi is a symbol not only for Tunisians, but also for the rest of the 
Arab world because his actions were an inspiration and a catalyst to fight against the 
government. All of this testifies to the fact that the blood of Bouazizi has given a heavy 
duty to the Arab people, Arab elites, political groups and social forces to act. According 
to several Tunisians, the revolution started in conjunction with the sacrifice of Mohamed 
Bouazizi because on the day he set himself on fire, a resistance front started organizing 
and coming together to back the people of Sidi Bouzid, consisting of union members, 
teachers, lawyers, doctors, and all sections of civil society.  
The name “Mohamed Bouazizi” also became a catalyst for other Tunisians 
citizens, including university students and the unemployed. The Dignity Revolution was 
largely then a reaction to long-accumulated economic grievances, but without Mohamed 
Bouazizi, the protests might not have been initiated. Only a few days after Bouazizi’s 
death, a university student named Ali Zarei and Hussein Nagi Felhi, also unemployed, 
committed suicide by climbing a high-voltage electric power line (Saleh, “Tunisia: 
IMF”). Furthermore, six months later, at least 107 Tunisians tried to kill themselves by 
setting themselves on fire (“Tunisia one year on: New Trend of Self-Immolations”). 
These incidents made the issue of Bouazizi’s death even bigger as their self-harming 
behaviors might have triggered people to think about the reasons that would let these 
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young people find death more attractive than life. These incidents also reinforced 
Bouazizi’s status as a hero and led revolutionary actions of the oppressed Tunisian youth 
to fight for their dignity. Bouazizi’s body represented the unfairly oppressed crying out in 
anger, and symbolized the oppressed Tunisians who, afraid, could not speak out. 
However, his brave action allowed their anger to explode at the same time and start the 
revolution together as a society. Mohamed Bouazizi, the first martyr of the Arab 
Revolution, chose to die for the cause of living in dignity. This also affirms the argument 
that self- immolation, in this situation, conveys a rhetorical act; it is “a powerful 
rhetorical act that utilizes self-inflicted violence as a means of performing a visual 
embodiment of violence done by an ‘other’” (Murray Yang 2). The resonance of the 
performative act of self-immolation creates an embodied space of resistance, activism 
and agency.  
Challenging Domination Through the Use of the Body 
 Using cultural syncretism, pastiche, embodied/performative vernacular and Hardt 
and Negri’s concept of power, I examine how self-immolation’s vernacular discourse 
interacts with mainstream discourses. By doing so, I seek to extend Ono and Sloop’s 
theoretical approach, an approach originally theorized within print media to include the 
material body. First, Hardt and Negri argue that the sovereign, as defined by Foucault as 
that which has power over life and death, “Relies on the consent or submission of the 
dominated” (Multitude 54). Second, Calafell and McIntosh call for a focus on turning 
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towards “discourses of the body” and its performances to consider the “body as/is 
rhetoric/al” (6). For instance, in Tunisia, under the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali, the 
oppressive government restricted political and economic freedom, simultaneously 
tolerating local corrupted government (Anderson). Therefore, Ben Ali had absolute 
power over the lives of his citizens. However, the weakness of the Ben Ali’s government 
was exploited when those in the margins rejected the regime by turning life itself, 
through the destruction of their own body, into a weapon (Hardt and Negri, Multitude 
54). Hence, the Tunisian citizen relied on the body as an embodied political power to 
defy the dominant ideologies. Following Ono and Sloop, Delgado and Calafell, and 
Holling and Calafell’s approach, I treat the act of self-immolation’s vernacular discourse 
as performative and embodied. To elaborate more on the politics of the body, Calafell 
and McIntosh state that, “Embodied rhetoric derives from the materiality of the body and 
its negotiations in relation to hegemonic rhetorical discourses” (3). In other words, 
vernacular discourse is performative in the sense that the line between vernacular and 
mainstream content is always fluid. Specifically, “Performance as a theoretical trajectory 
reveals the body as a site of knowing and doing. When we focus here agency is returned 
to the body” (Calafell and McIntosh 14-15). In that sense, within this performative 
framework, there is a privileging of the body as a space for empowerment and resistance 
opening up for new possibilities. On the other hand, the concept of “cultural syncretism” 
suggests that the creation of vernacular rhetoric and the contestation of mainstream 
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discourse happen simultaneously. To this point, Hardt and Negri explicitly contend that 
self-immolation (as well as suicide bombing) radically challenges the absolute authority 
of the sovereign power (Hardt and Negri, Empire 332). The destruction of one’s own 
body can be seen as a rejection of the subjugation of the sovereign power, by reclaiming 
one’s own political freedom and agency through death. Calafell and McIntosh affirm that, 
Embodied rhetoric derives from the materiality of the body and its 
negotiations in relation to hegemonic rhetorical discourses. Thus, 
communities may organize around ‘ideas’ […], but vernaculars of the 
body are carved out by marginalized bodies intrinsic to their difference 
from the dominant; this is not a community built on ideas, but a 
community build on their embodied difference. (3)  
 
Therefore, there is a rejection of oppression while at the same time a creation of new 
subjectivity (cultural syncretism).  
The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi created a new subjectivity among the 
Arab populations, exemplifying a complete and absolute rebuttal to the oppressive 
government,  
When life itself is negated in the struggle to challenge sovereignty, the 
power over life and death that the sovereign exercises becomes useless. 
The absolute weapons against bodies are neutralized by the voluntary and 
absolute negation of the body. (Hardt and Negri, Empire 332)  
 
The widespread vernacular vis-à-vis Bouzizi’s sacrifice for justice allowed the 
Tunisian revolution to create a wave of liberatory demonstrations throughout the Arab 
region. The performance of self-immolation created a new look of the Arab body and 
subjectivity; in other words, “The aesthetic qualities of [this] performance disrupt[ed] 
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representational politics and jar[red] correlations between the politics of the body and 
discourse” (Calafell and McIntosh 11, based on Foust’s concept of resistance as a mode 
of transgression). Hence, Mohamed Bouazizi’s actions flourished a revolutionary spirit 
within the “youth bulge” that is present in Middle Eastern societies, “60 percent of the 
population is under 25 years old, with a median age of 24” (Al-Momani 161). Young 
people within these nations have been unable to achieve their potential because of the 
rising unemployment and poverty. This has lead to an enormous dissatisfied young 
population eager to create change. Tunisians identified with Bouzizi’s performative act 
and employed the “one of us” rhetorical strategy to keep the momentum of the revolution 
alive. The new subjectivity created by Bouazizi ignited the flame that was waiting to be 
lit, “with their freedoms continuously thwarted and confused, their socio-economic states 
declining, and their education lacking the necessary facets for progressive social action, it 
took only a spark to ignite the masses” (Al-Momani 162).  
Language as a Vernacular Discourse 
This section investigates the explanatory power of language usage in describing 
why the “Arab Spring” is both a local and transnational regional phenomenon. Language 
is a critical component of the “Arab Spring” uprisings. In countries, like Tunisia, where 
certain kinds of speech and particularly anti-regime expression are monitored, regulated, 
and punishable by both legal and extra-legal means, an imperative like “Dégage” (“leave/ 
get out”) is interpreted by the regime as action. Language mixing and code switching 
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between modern Arabic, colloquial Arabic, French, and English in the context of the 
“Arab Spring” reflect an intended level of audience engagement and involvement. In the 
“Arab Spring,” involvement is a choice the chanter makes after determining a 
communicative aim and finally delivering it at a code choice based on her/his perception 
of the intended audience. The chants are designed to increase public engagement and 
sustain the tenor of the uprisings in order to provoke the revolutionary movement, or 
action. The language of the “Arab Spring” is a critical form of action. The shouted 
slogans of the demonstrators take the form of couplets with predictable and simple 
rhyming patterns that set the tone and meter of the protests. These revolutionary chants 
and slogans, 
carry the sentiments and objectives of the revolutionaries across national 
and international borders, down streets and alleys, but also transmit the 
entitlement, the right, the messages, and the drive to revolt into the mouths 
and feet of the public at large, but also into the language of spectators 
who, in turn, are driven to activism. (Colla, “The Poetry of Revolt”) 
 
In participating in a protest one understands her/his words to be a form of 
revolutionary activism, or involvement. In most cases, the language of the “Arab Spring” 
slogans has been mainly colloquial Arabic (mixed with French and English words), 
which, this research argues, contributes to the transnationalism of the uprisings because 
dialects are perceived to be the authentic speech of the people and therefore travel more 
easily across borders. With the words of the people echoing across borders, revolutionary 
action is inspired. Elliot Colla (“The Poetry of Revolt”) explains that the “slogans the 
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protestors are chanting are couplets—and they are as loud as they are sharp.” This poetry 
is “not an ornament to the uprising,” but rather it is a veritable “soundtrack and also 
composes a significant part of the action itself” (Colla, “The Poetry of Revolt”). In the 
“Arab Spring” uprisings, then, poets are warriors. This analysis suggests that the chanters 
in the uprisings believe the revolution to be popular and, while they perceive their 
audiences to be Arabs of all nationalities, they choose to speak and be moved by 
colloquial rather than modern Arabic. While the regime speaks modern Arabic, the  
protestors speak their dialects to engage locals and use modern Arabic to interact with 
and spread the revolution regionally. 
The People Naming the Movement: Is it a Revolution or a Spring?  
The terminology used to describe the revolutionary movements that swept the 
Middle Eats and North Africa have been very diverse and different from one country to 
the other, and one media outlet to the other. One of the phrases that received most of the 
popularity, specifically, among Western nations is the term “Arab Spring.” Conversely, 
as I arrived in Tunis, from the Taxi driver who picked me up from the airport, to the 
receptionist at the hotel I stayed in, I started realizing how incorrect and offensive the use 
of the phrase “Arab Spring” is to the people. According to many of the people I talked to, 
the reasoning behind the inappropriateness of the phrase the “Arab Spring” is that it does 
not reflect the sacrifices and the reforms that citizens, specifically of Tunisia, have 
endured. This phrase is dismissive of the people’s struggles and what they have fought 
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for throughout the revolts. Upon my discussions and conversations with several Tunisian 
men and women, I’ve come to learn the different words they use to communicate the 
revolutionary movements in Tunisia. First, the Tunisian people employ the term 
“Thawra,” meaning revolution in Arabic to refer to their political actions and what they 
have being doing throughout the revolutions. Second, when Tunisians describe the 
communal revolutionary movements across the region, they describe it by deploying the 
terms “Thawarat” (meaning revolutions), “Intifada” (meaning uprising), “Nahda” 
(meaning renaissance), and “Karama” (meaning dignity). However, the terminology that 
is preferred among several men and women in Tunisia is the phrase  “Thawrat Al 
Mowaten Alaarabi” (the revolution of the Arab citizen), referring to the holistic meaning 
behind the revolutionary movement and how it is a call for democracy and social justice 
for all citizens in the region. This phrase translates the activism, engagement, and agency 
that people have embodied since the birth of the Arab states.  
Hence, several Tunisians find the term “Arab Spring” a weak detonator of the 
movement, and an illusive lens that does not mirror the reality of the unlimited 
demonstrations and protests that are still taking the streets of the Arab world. According 
to several Tunisians I talked to, the phrase “Arab Spring” implies the notion of waking up 
in the spring season after taking a long-term sleep during the winter. This notion 
communicates that Arab people throughout the region enjoyed being passive citizens 
under dictatorships without arising and revolting. This idea is indeed dismissive of the 
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social and political actions that the people of the region have taken before, during, and 
after the revolutions or the “Arab Spring.” Another critique by the Tunisian people is that 
the word spring denotes a seasonal passage, a temporary movement, rather than an 
enduring reformative movement. This transitory implication of the “Arab Spring” rejects 
the long-term demands of the revolution, and minimizes the fights and struggles the 
revolutionaries have experienced. To many of the Tunisians, the movements were not a 
“spring” as it caused the deaths and injuries of many citizens who resisted the authorities.  
Other citizens that I talked to in Tunisia also expressed how the term “Arab 
Spring” expresses the legacy of Orientalist tropes in explaining events vis-à-vis the 
movements. This specific terminology reinforces the inevitable narratives of the clash 
between the West and the East; a logic that demonizes the revolutions and flattens the 
complex realities of the “Arab Spring” and its subjectivities. It also essentializes the 
revolutionaries by depicting them as agentless victims of their respective political 
regimes who have finally awakened from their submissive and voluntary oppression. In 
other words, revolutionary, self-determinant, self-assertive Arab citizenries are not tied to 
a season, but rather to a vocabulary of movement and resistance. Hence, changing the 
language that frames the revolutions is one of the first steps into breaking the 
Orientalist’s inherent legacies and reclaiming agency. Discarding the phrase “Arab 
Spring” and using an active and resistive terminology is the initial point into fully 
learning about the revolutionary body of these movements.  
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The Cultural (re)Production of Revolutionary Chants 
One of the creations of the Tunisian revolution is the originality of its poetry that 
the revolutionists developed into “couplet-slogans” as a means of the uprising. The 
chants should be seen as a “language uprising” first (and a verbal occupation of the 
public space). Those chants created a vocabulary that defies the public fear of speaking 
against governmental institutions and its holders. D. Soyini Madison citing Jan Cohen-
Cruz on street performance argues, “Cohen-Cruz writes, ‘When one needs most to disturb 
the peace, street performance creates visions of what society might be and arguments 
against what it is.’” (167). Hence, when the people started shouting out the chants 
expressing their discontent with the oppressive regime, they fractured a chain of years of 
censorship, of speaking up against injustices. Couplet-slogans such as “We will not 
remain silent/quiet” and “No fear, no horror, power to the people,” created an 
atmosphere where the Tunisian citizens, for the first time, can practice their right to free 
speech. The chants also created a sense of community and collectivism that unified the 
Tunisian people and brought them together for action. The chants also created a political 
platform, and social stand against the regime from a public space (something that was 
exclusive to private spaces).  
Most of the mottos, either chanted or written came with new social, economic, 
and political demands to the government, as well as exposing the corrupted actions of the 
government and the leaders. The following are examples of the chants I recorded during 
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my fieldwork in Tunisia, which –occupied- and still occupying the new political public 
sphere in the country: 
“To the Government of thieves, Employment is our right,” “Employment, 
freedom, and collective dignity.” “Free, free Tunisia, and the Assassins out” 
Dégage! 
Ennahda dehors. Assassins out. 
Ennahda Assassin 
Tunisie Libre. Trabelsi: voleurs dehors. 
Game over 
Dégage 
 Dégage is one of the iconic mottos of the Tunisian revolution. Dégage is a French 
term used in the colloquial Tunisian dialect meaning “leave/ get out” in reference to the 
uprising in 2011 to overthrow the president Ben Ali and his government. The phrase got 
its popularity during the January 14th uprising in Lhbib Bourgiba Street from determined 
protesters denouncing the corrupted and abusive actions of the government.  
Dégage is also seen at the “symbol” of the Tunisian anger that did not only mirror 
the people’s discontent with the government, but also forced president Ben Ali to leave 
the government and escape. Hence, Dégage was transformed into a political motto that 
symbolizes a unified voice of the Tunisian people coming together to challenge a 
dictatorship and revolt against the police state. The Tunisian people gave a new meaning 
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to the French word “Dégage” that it does not only mean “leave or get out,” but it’s rather 
redefined as call for democracy, for change, and hope. 
The term “Dégage” has also outspread to other Arab states, including Libya, 
Egypt, and Syria. Using the Arab form of “Dégage=Ir7al,” the people in those countries 
have been repeating the phrase “ Ir7al ya Mubarak,” “Ir7al ya Morsi,” “Ir7la ya 
Bashar,” “Ir7al ya Qaddafi,” voicing their discontent with the government and calling for 
an outcast of those leaders. The following is the original chant entitled Dégage by 
Joumaa Boualib, which is still repeated in the streets of Tunis by thousands of 
demonstrators as a symbol of the continuation of the revolution, 
“Dégage!” for the sun to come back 
Dégage so that safety that we knew before you occupied us comes back 
Dégage so that we can taste the bread and olive oil without sorrow or a fight 
Dégage so that we can bring back the hope to rebuild our dreams 
Dégage!... 
So that our fears from you can leave us 
So that we can be able to sleep without nightmares 
Without spies in our windows 





So that we can finally breathe 
Dégage!….. 
I spent quite a bit of time walking all around Tunis to speak with Tunisians from 
different walks of life, but mostly to get a feel for the rhythms of street life and the public 
arena that ultimately will shape the course of Tunisia ’s future. Experiencing my first 
demonstration that was taking place in Lhbib Bourgiba was most noteworthy mainly for 
showing how Tunisians are continuing struggles for freedom, dignity, democracy and 
whatever other desired objectives ordinary Arab men and women seek as they continue 
exiting from the dark chamber of their frozen history of the past half century or so.  
Another important motto to the Tunisian revolution is “Bread and water and Ben 
Ali No.” This is a very unique motto to the Tunisian revolution that was not seen in the 
rest of the Arab world. The protesters repeated, “Bread and water and Ben Ali No.” The 
motto sent a clear message to the government that the revolution is not only about the 
poor living conditions of the people and the high food inflation that Tunisia is 
experiencing, but it’s about reclaiming agency and dignity from the police state the 
corrupted government. The Tunisians I had the opportunity to talk to expressed that the 
mottos of the Tunisian Revolution was a call for “dignity before bread.” The motto was 
an awakening call for the ex-president Ben Ali communicating that people will not be 




Implications of Dégage 
The term Dégage speaks directly to critical rhetoricians as it is a call to focus on 
the rhetoric of the oppressed. As they define it, vernacular discourse is “Speech that 
resonates within local communities. This discourse is neither accessible in its entirety, 
nor is it discoverable except through texts. However, vernacular discourse is also culture: 
the music, art, criticism, dance, and architecture of local communities” (Ono and Sloop 
20). In other words, the Tunisian colloquial term Dégage was only accessible to the local 
Tunisians, its significance was not accessible to non-Tunisians.  
Hence, as a vernacular discourse, the chanting of the phrase Dégage affirms the 
culture it expresses. In other words, the syncretic aspect of Dégage is a discourse that is 
not just in opposition to the dominant regime in Tunisia, but expressive of vernacular 
beliefs and subjectivities. It is affirmative of the hybrid Tunisian subjectivity that crosses 
the borders between French and Arabic. It is a language of a multicultural identity. 
However, using the French terminology as the main slogan in the Tunisian revolution 
could also be seen as reinforcing the dominant ideology of colonial and imperial 
mentality that embraces French means as a way of liberation, specifically that Tunisia 
was a French colony. According to the French president, Francois Hollande, “Speaking 
French, is also speaking the language of human rights because human rights were 
inscribed in the French language” (“Allocution de Son Excellence Monsieur François 
Hollande Président ”). In other words, Hollande reinforces the idea that language and 
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culture are intertwined: if you speak French, you think French, you act French, and you 
embrace stronger ties with France. Therefore, speaking French in the Tunisian revolution 
could maintain the dominance of the French over their former colony by taking credit for 
the uprisings. But on the other hand, the usage of the term Dégage has always been 
paired with Arabic words, there has always been a mixing of Arabic and French in this 
revolutionary slogan, such as “Dégage ya Ben Ali,” “Dégage ya Shafar.” Therefore, this 
fragmented deployment of different languages from two different cultures is creating new 
effects (pastiche). As Ono and Sloop write: “Pastiche implies that vernacular discourse 
may borrow from, without mimicking, popular culture” (23). This borrowing from a 
Western culture and mixing it with an Arabic culture allows vernacular communities to 
constitute their own cultures outside the hegemonic ideology, but also means that 
fragments of dominant ideology-French- may find themselves expressed within 
vernacular discourses. However, Dégage resulted in a transformative end. The chanted 
slogan transformed from being the rhetoric of the oppressed to being a dominant voice 
that changed the system, and ousted the authoritarian regime.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I use the synthesized concept of “embodied vernacular discourse” 
to examine graffiti, language, and self-immolation’s vernacular discourse from three 
angles: content, agency, and subjectivity. I found that analyzed vernacular discourses did 
demonstrate some revolutionary potential. 
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First, this analysis communicates how my mother’s performance in Avenue 
Lahbib Bourgiba is a manifestation of the participation of Muslim and Arab women in 
the “Arab Spring.” Her performance conveys a complex discursive and embodied 
multiplicity that refuses the binary of looking of at conflicts/revolutions from a “gender-
emancipatory discourses” versus “gender-subordinate,” and reinforces the arguments that 
the experiences of women in the “Arab Spring” are significantly more diverse, both in 
terms of the day-to-day-life and in terms of political significance. My mother’s 
performance created a space where possible alliances between difference and diverse 
bodies are formed in their efforts for justice. 
Second, Zwewla specifically challenged the hegemonic views about 
Tunisians/Arabs while simultaneously establishing their own vernacular rhetoric and thus 
(re)building a new community through the graffiti. They also constructed hybrid 
subjectivities by travelling along the borders of different vernacular communities, and 
deconstructing the differences among Tunisians/Maghrebis and Arabs. Indeed, Zwewla’s 
vernacular discourses are “Fragmented, unconnected, even contradictory or momentarily 
oppositional” (McKerrow 451). Their graffiti represents a transnational form of art where 
those graffitist, instead of rejecting the West, they’re embracing it through art and 




Moreover, the revolutionary language used in the uprisings is an important 
finding to note. The language is affirmative of the hybrid Tunisian subjectivity that 
crosses the borders between French and Arabic. It is a language of a multicultural 
identity. Another important finding of this study is the agency created through self-
immolation. The destruction of one’s own body can be seen as a rejection of the 
subjugation of the sovereign power, by reclaiming one’s own political freedom and 
agency through death. Therefore, there is a rejection of oppression while at the same time 
a creation of new subjectivity. Bouzizi’s death created a subjectivity among the Arab 
populations, exemplifying a complete and absolute rebuttal to the oppressive government. 
Therefore, this analysis affirms the argument within rhetorical criticism that rhetoric is 















CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF VERNACULAR DISCOURSE IN THE “ARAB 
SPRING” 
Arabizing Vernacular Discourse 
Returning to the research questions I posed at the beginning of this project, the 
graffiti, the chants, and the act of self-immolation constitute an embodied vernacular 
rhetoric through their execution of enduring rhetorical transactions surrounding cultural 
(re)production of discourses. The vernacular discourses created during the “Arab Spring” 
accomplished the construction of arguments for the uprisings and against the 
authoritarian regimes, as well as a resistive momentum, through the primarily use of 
those means. As suggested, the graffiti, and the revolutionary chants challenged the 
hegemonic frames and discourses surrounding the Arab subjectivities. In terms of policy, 
the government in Tunisia responded by limiting vernacular contestation through painting 
over the walls that contain the graffiti, for example. At the same time, the circulation of 
the chants, the graffiti and the act of self-immolation, functioned rhetorically to challenge 
mainstream media coverage of the movement and the people. 
The Arab uprisings, thus, brought attention to vernacular discourse as medium of 
dissent, through acts of self-immolation, street chants, and graffiti. They reaffirmed the 
centrality of the vernacular, more specifically, in public struggles around cultural, social, 
and economic ideals that are bound to animate the emerging body politic. The visibility 
and appearance of vernacular discourse are indicative of the characteristics of larger 
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dilemmas around national identity and political participation in the Arab states. Scholars 
have long argued that orientalist discourses about the voices and the bodies of Arabs and 
Muslims reinforce processes of domination and Othering in a neocolonial context (Abu 
Lughod; Ahmed; Puar, Said). What this project attempted to highlight is the need to 
investigate the Arab vernacular, beyond orientalist gaze, as a discursive site for political-
meaning making within national histories that are informed by but irreducible to colonial 
experience. Hence, unpacking and distinguishing local political discourses disturbs the 
fixed binaries of East/West, and provides more insights to the realities of these 
subjectivities. It gives agency to Arab subjectivities to (re)create the Orient and its 
knowledge production.  
The vernacular discourses in the “Arab Spring” also addressed the role of citizen 
in steering a democracy through an examination of the rhetoric that influenced the 
general climate of public spheres and public opinion, and created a political public 
sphere. The vernaculars of the Arab Spring created a solid argument in the region that the 
citizen matters. It started to put in place the essential building blocks of democratic 
systems; from the implementation of pluralistic citizen participation, to creating more 
mechanisms of accountability. The vernaculars of the people implemented these rules in 
the soil of Tunisia. The graffiti, the acts of self-immolation, and the chants disclosed how 
members of the Tunisian society discovered and clarified their shared interests and 
engaged in exchanges that shaped their opinions on issues of common interest. Paying 
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close attention to how members of society engage in public dialogue reveals a picture of 
citizens who are contentious on matters that affect their lives. This project contributes to 
the conceptual framework, of vernacular discourse, to understand how the rhetorical 
character of formal and informal communication is formed, expressed, and how it shapes 
identities. It also explores the role of cultural production of discourses in shaping the 
recent political transformations in Tunisia.  
More importantly, the project of examining Arabs’ communicative expressions is 
crucial in highlighting the “voices” of the people, and in creating new ways of 
understanding communication in postcolonial/neocolonial settings. The vernacular 
discourses of the “Arab Spring” voice specific communicative practices from localized 
Arab communities and explore their significance for Arab subjectivities and the politics 
of national and cultural belonging. The chants, the acts of self-immolation, and the 
graffiti sought to explore the plurality of Arab discourse and cultural expression, the 
resonances that make a pan-Arab identity, as well as the hybridity that comes from 
multiple voices and bodies. The goal of this project is forwarding a theoretical and 
methodological grounding for the study of Arab communication, or vernacular discourse. 
In other words, through the employment of a “metatheory” (Holling and Calafell), this 
research systematizes a model for studying Arab voices and symbolic practices sensitive 




This deployment of a metatheoretical perspective could be seen through an 
overview of the chapters of this research project. For instance, the first chapter of the 
dissertation explores the multiple foundational elements in the knowledge production of 
discourses around the “Arab Spring,” as well as the general mediated construction of the 
“Orient,” including the history of the theoretical foundations of the study of Orientalism 
as a critical theory and Orientalist feminism as they relate to the field of communication 
more generally and rhetoric more specifically. The second chapter examines the 
importance of theorizing through the body and lived experiences to advocate for 
challenging dominant binaries and producing alternative discourses to the understanding 
of activism and resistance in the Arab uprisings. Building on Muslim feminism as an 
extension of theories of the flesh, where Muslim feminists theorize through their lived 
experiences and link the personal to the political, which offers a metatheoretical 
framework to explore the close relationship between the role that voice, verbalization and 
embodied expression in constructing and challenging representation. The “fleshing” as a 
theoretical platform provides a nuanced approach to applying vernacular discourse as 
methodology to the analysis of discourses on race, postcolonialism, resistance, 
democratic reforms, borders, trans/national identity and the voices of expression crafted 
by Arab communities in response. The final chapter surveys the Tunisian “Arab Spring” 
as a case study to critically analyze the cultural (re)production of the uprisings, from the 
border blurring elements of the usage of hybrid vernaculars in the graffiti and the chants, 
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to bodily performances of street demonstrations and self-immolation. This chapter 
deconstructs how voices of normal citizens engage in trans/national political issues and 
negotiate dominant discourses of nation, justice, and inclusion. Extending on Calafell and 
Holling’s theoretical conceptualization of Latina/o vernacular discourse, which describes 
Latin@ voices as those that “interact with and against prevailing discourses about and/or 
concerning Latin@s” and entail both “liberatory and constraining dimensions” (xvii); this 
research project expands to include Arab voices and bodies that also contest 
marginalizing relationships and representations, while at the same time construct their 
subjectivities in a multifarious dynamic process. The vernacular discourse of the “Arab 
Spring” furthers people of color’s scholarship to integrate Arab voices and bodies by 
calling for an interdisciplinary approach to studying Arab communicative expressions. 
The practices of the Arab citizen in the uprisings revealed a “liberatory” voice that is 
worth of study and analysis, a voice that is both “precious and tenuous” (Ono and Sloop).  
 In other words, vernacular discourses of the “Arab Spring” created complex 
articulations of identity construction and performances in “new/complex” political spaces 
that embrace and challenge –simultaneously- dominant ideologies and cultural practices. 
This complex conceptualization of vernacular discourses of the revolutionary body in this 
project opens up issues of agency, identity, and representation that have been merely 
discussed in dichotomous ways, and voices a revisionist model of reading Arab 
communicative practices to move beyond reductionism and embrace multiplicity to “Be 
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heard in a variety of ways, and in different positionalities” (Holling and Calafell xviii).  
The project also highlighted the importance of understanding citizens’ ways of 
communicating conflict, and the significance of holding active communicative practices 
that enable power-negotiations between citizens and the leaders.  
The Contextualization of the Content Contribution of this Project 
In many ways the “Arab Spring” can largely be understood as the movement of 
voices, bodies, ideas, and political and social objectives across political borders through 
the medium of visual, textual, and embodied vernaculars. This analysis has demonstrated 
how the “Arab Spring” that started with Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December 2010, 
which initiated a regional revolt strengthened by a set of solid principles and demands 
developed not in the pages of a scholarly article or the work of a recognizable analyst but 
through the bodies of normal citizens and the improvised protest-slogans that circulated 
in the congested squares of Arab neighborhoods from Tunisia to Syria. The vernacular 
discourses of the “Arab Spring” destroyed the censorships and the fears that kept the 
voices and the bodies of the Arab citizens “hidden” for years in their respective countries. 
The cultural (re)production of the vernacular from blazing revolutionary language as 
“karama” (dignity), “assulta lisha’b” (power to the people), and “thawra” (revolution) 
grave new meanings to voices and to the identities of the people. It reconstructed a 




The “Arab Spring” has proven that even with the high security control that citizens 
endured for years, the dynamic, counter-narrative discourses that were articulated by 
countless individuals overtook the regime’s rhetoric, and indeed its control over of the 
people and the state. The spontaneity of people’s vernaculars also helped make the 
uprisings unstoppable and inevitable in the face of control. 
The chants of the revolution, the language of revolution, and the performance of 
the revolution provide critical socio- and politico-vernacular contexts that contribute to a 
fuller understanding of the overall regional situation and the localized iterations of the 
Arab revolutionary moment. In Tunisia, the critical vernacular discourse analyses of the 
graffiti and the language help to demonstrate and interpret mass-scale popular reactions 
in and outside of a politico-vernacular context. Relying largely on the framing works of 
Ono and Sloop, Calafell, and Holling and Calafell, my findings support the theory that 
vernacular discourse act as a carrier and conveyor of revolutionary sentiments, as well as 
a visible validator of the voices and bodies of the marginalized who created an 
identification space allowing the people to embody the “thawra” (revolution).  
It is also important to note how the “Arab Spring” has stemmed from a 
multilateral historicity, which requires specific attention rather than broad 
generalizations. My mother’s opening piece in the beginning of Chapter Four, which 
articulated her participation in the street protest and her reiteration of the poem “The will 
to live” to the Tunisian poet Abu Al Kacem Chebbi from the 1930s, is especially 
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memorable moment for its preface that reminds the reader/researcher that Arab revolts 
and reform movements are nothing new and cannot be simply ascribed to the emergence 
of Twitter or a seasonal “awakening” of a people. It is also an acknowledgement that 
each performance and form of the uprising in the Middle East and North Africa is Arab 
and not an abnormality or a victory for the seemingly non-Arab “West.” To assume or 
argue otherwise would underestimate the revolutionaries and perpetuate the most devious 
of stereotypes that essentialize a diverse grouping of peoples as somehow unthinking, 
stationary, complacent automatons rather than vibrant, reflexive, intelligent, thoughtful 
human beings capable of discerning their own destinies and, indeed, in the words of 
Edward Said, able to speak truth to power. 
As for the brave individuals who continue to struggle against violent oppression, 
and express themselves fearlessly with a newfound strength and collective consciousness 
that gave birth to the “Arab Spring” and its many vernaculars and socio-political 
identities, it is critical that academia respect the absolutely irreducible complexities of 
what these demonstrators, artists, and everyday citizens are doing. From Michelle Holling 
and Bernadette Callafell to Lila Abu- Lughod, they formulate the discourse of identity 
formation within a vernacular of overlapping tensions that is vital to consider in 
analyzing the inter-relations of vernaculars, resistance, and national identity in the “Arab 
Spring.” Identity formation, according to Abu-Lughod, takes place “Between practices 
and their justifications, between ideals and behavior, between simple prescriptions and 
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multiple interpretations, between a sense of the universal and the complexity of local and 
individual experience” (25). Indeed, the identities of the revolutionaries protesting in 
Tunisia and across the Arab region are being formed and re-formed in the between spaces 
of politics, society, culture, religion, economics, and, importantly, the vernacular. Hence, 
the revolutionaries created “Spaces for connection across difference based on shared 
feelings of Otherness, [and/] or collectively should not be downplayed where there are 
possibilities for coalition building, particularly in contemporary political climates” 
(Holling and Calafell 22).   
My findings also illustrate examples that resonate with the theory and the praxis 
of vernacular discourse, in the case of the “Arab Spring,” it acted as a carrier and 
conveyor of revolutionary sentiments. The graffiti artists, Zwewla, challenged the 
hegemonic views about Tunisians/ Arabs while simultaneously establishing their own 
vernacular rhetoric and thus (re)building a new community through the graffiti. They also 
constructed hybrid subjectivities by travelling along the borders of different vernacular 
communities, and deconstructing the differences among Tunisians/Maghrebis and Arabs. 
Their graffiti represents a transnational form of art where those graffitist, instead of 
rejecting the West, they’re embracing it through art and revolutionary symbols, but 
reinterpreting it to their specific histories and to match their needs. Moreover, the 
revolutionary language used in the uprisings is an important finding to note. The 
language is affirmative of the hybrid Tunisian subjectivity that crosses the borders 
	  
125 
between French and Arabic. It is a language of a multicultural identity. Another 
important finding of this study is the agency created through self-immolation. The 
destruction of one’s own body can be seen as a rejection of the subjugation of the 
sovereign power, by reclaiming one’s own political freedom and agency through death. 
Hence, the usage of the graffiti, revolutionary and hybrid language, and self-immolation, 
serve as an event-catalyst by providing communicative expressions that can readily and 
quickly travel across borders. These communicative expressions are tools and weapons in 
the hands of the graffiti artists, and the mouths of the demonstrators as they offer a 
resource and technique with which to strengthen a resistance on the individual and 
collective levels against what they articulated as domination, corruption, injustice, or 
simply the stagnation of the status quo. These voices, images, words, rhythms, and bodies 
form a vernacular of opposition that can, as this research project argues, be considered 
the language of the “Arab Spring,” and it is a vernacular used transnationally in the Arab 
region that in and of itself is a critical form of revolutionary activism. That said, it can 
also be, and is, used to push physical actions towards social change to further a regional, 
yet highly localized, political reform agenda. 
The vernacular discourse of the “Arab Spring” initially aimed at initiating the 
breakdown of long-time dictators and succeeded with incredible rapidity at ousting the 
regime of Tunisia’s Ben Ali in the case of Tunisia. The vernacular discourse of the “Arab 
Spring” communicates a set of attitudes and ideologies that are, arguably, born out of a 
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spirit of anger and frustration, and the desire to improve one’s standing and change 
society, and the nation state, for the better. This revolutionary spirit is perhaps 
summarized best in the political transnational phrase that swept across Tunisia and the 
rest of the Arab region, and built the collective political consciousness: “Dégage”(leave). 
Synthesizing an Assemblage of a Hybrid Articulation of Vernacular Discourse 
The contextualization of vernacular discourse in the study of the “Arab Spring” 
suggests the importance of considering “hybridity” as a characteristic of vernacular 
discourse in terms of its subjectivity, agency and content. Through the case study of 
Tunisia, this research shows how and to what extent a vernacular discourse is hybridized 
in terms of these characteristics. Hence, I call for critical rhetoricians to use hybridity as a 
political strategy to read the construction of subjectivities in their respective vernaculars. 
As such, I suggest the following model of analysis to consider while studying vernaculars 
of the “Arab Spring”: 
1. Examining the Hybrid Assemblages of Agency  
In this research project, I treated the agencies of the vernacular discourse of the 
“Arab Spring” as hybrid. By agency, I refer to the ability of an agent to act in either the 
textual, or visual, or embodied spaces of a specific context (in the case of the “Arab 
Spring” it is an assemblage of vernaculars). The agencies that help generate the 
vernacular discourse of the “Arab Spring” are hybrid in that personal and institutional 
agencies are intertwined in the making of these vernaculars. On the one hand, the popular 
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Tunisian graffiti on the walls of the street claim a type of personal agency, and indeed 
individuals do have the agency to post their own arts and political demands on the walls 
and articulate their vernacular voices. On the other hand, the street walls, the platform on 
which these vernacular voices are shared, is institutional. It is a space controlled by the 
security apparatuses of the government that could arrest people for “polluting” the public 
sphere. Hence, the graffitists analyzed in this research had to negotiate their own personal 
agency with the government’s institutional agency to participate in the public sphere. In 
order for them to practice their art in a public space, they had to embrace the 
government’s rules of survival. One important rule of survival is making the graffiti at 
night-when no one is watching- to avoid the government’s surveillance and restrictions. 
As such, this mode of analysis suggests the significance of exploring how citizens’ 
personal agencies and government’s institutional agency collectively shape or constrain 
vernacular discourses on either private or pubic spheres, and in particular, how political 
graffitists in this case cope with the government’s priority for social order. 
2. Examining the Hybrid Assemblages of Content 
Vernacular discourse of the “Arab Spring” extends Ono and Sloop’s (2005) 
theoretical approach, an approach originally theorized within print media, to the graffiti, 
chants and bodily acts. The research also builds on Holling and Calafell’s 
conceptualization of Latin@ Vernacular Discourse to include Arab subjectivities. Using 
these approaches, I studied the vernacular discourse as hybrid. In the case of the “Arab 
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Spring,” the usage of language is a manifestation of a hybrid Tunisian identity that 
crosses the borders between French and Arabic. It is a language of a multicultural 
identity. The hybrid content of the graffiti exposes a complex way to describe and 
analyze the people of the Middle East and North Africa. The close-analysis of the hybrid 
content of the graffiti, for instance, brought to the forefront the diversity within 
“Arabness,” combating the misconceptions and biases against the notion of the “one” 
Arab identity. Furthermore, while there are studies that have looked at the role of popular 
mediated images as a medium for deconstructing representations and agency, very few of 
them have conducted systematic discourse analyses on the content of the vernacular, a 
gap this research project aims to fulfill. Hence, it is important for rhetoricians to analyze 
content from a hybrid lens to uncover issues related to their studied communities, and 
challenge traditional constructionism of identities that is prevalent in mainstream 
discourses. 
3. Examining the Hybrid Assemblages of Subjectivity 
This research project on the vernacular discourse of the “Arab Spring” brought 
attention to the significance of analyzing how normal citizens use hybridity as a political 
strategy to construct their subjectivities. The deployment of hybridity as a political 
strategy refers to a subjectivity that troubles the boundaries of social classifications and 
exerts its positive influence by dancing along the borders (Bhabha). In other words, the 
hybridization of subjectivity disrupts its traditional formation, and establishes a queer and 
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ambiguous subjectivity, which offers a new space where the discursive 
(re/de)constructedness is witnessed. That is to say, for a critical discourse analysis, it is 
important to engage in border crossing, articulating variable discourses that are composed 
of many overlapping forces beyond focusing on one single identity. For instance, the 
deployment of different languages in the Tunisian chants, such as Dégage, challenges the 
essentialized categorizations that reinforce a Euro-Americo-centric perspective of an 
authentic “Arabness,” and employs a hybridity strategy that articulate discourses by 
traveling along the borders of several intersecting groups involved in subjectivity 
construction (e.g., Arabs/Tunisians/Maghrebians/ French; an assemblages of multiple 
cultures and historicity).   
To summarize, the synthesizing of a hybrid articulation of vernacular discourse 
urges scholars to consider the vernacular discourse of the “Arab Spring” as hybrid in 
terms of subjectivity, content, and agency; and explore their hybridization processes. The 
project also calls for employing hybridity as a political strategy to examine how everyday 
citizens use this method to (re/de)constructing their subjectivities. 
Expanding the Project on the “Arab Spring” 
 Assessing the relational efficacy of vernacular discourses in shaping the 
revolutionary body in the “Arab Spring” requires an examination of the different Arab 
States as well as the conduct of interviews of different voices from the region to provide a 
more holistic study of the Arab vernacular. The participant observation I engaged in 
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helped construct an embodied vernacular, which adds an important dimension of 
credibility to what I termed the “resonance” of my arguments about the relationship 
between the vernacular discourse and the (re/de) construction of Arab subjectivities. 
However, as I started the collection of my data in July 2013 (during the ousting of the 
Egyptian former president Mohammed Morsi), the Internal Review Board (IRB) advised 
me not to conduct interviews with the revolutionists in the region, as not to endanger their 
beings or mine, as a researcher, and wait till the turmoil is resolved. Hence, for next year, 
I will seek another approval from the IRB to conduct further interviews with informants 
in the Arab region and revisit my findings of the vernacular. Besides, another significant 
step for this research project is to further analyze the different vernaculars deployed in the 
different Arab states and conduct a comparative analysis of those vernaculars. Although 
this step would require collaboration and larger research funds to cover travel research 
expenses, the findings will conceptualize Arab vernacular discourse on a much larger 
scale. 
The other step moving forward for this study, I suggest that it is also significant to 
explore how “affect scholarship” would add new ways of thinking vis-à-vis the 
“eventness” of the “Arab Spring.” The “affective turn” in social sciences indicates that 
there is a limit to representational analyses (Puar). For this study, I am also interested in 
exploring the affective turn in the scholarship in order to bridge representational politics 
and affect rather leaving behind representation. I think it would be relevant to investigate 
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how these “seemingly opposed theories” could enrich each other by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of identities. For instance, Jasbir Puar, building on Brian 
Massumi’s work, argues that identity is a retroactive categorization of the emergent, 
unfolding present. That is to say, these retrospective categorizations necessitate a 
representational politics that tells only part of the story and maintains a central role for 
the subject (Puar). What is necessary, as Puar states, is “an epistemology of ontology and 
affect, a representational schema of affect” (207). In other words, rather than claiming an 
escape from or leaving behind representation, it is the tension between symbolic systems, 
processes of signification, and affect that could become central to the analysis of the 
event (Puar). Hence, to conceptualize the “Arab Spring” through the theorization of 
“affect,” would prioritize movement over placement in talking about what Arab bodies 
do rather than what they are, what Arabness has come to mean, how it has come to be felt 
and deployed. Answering those questions through an affective lens would add new 
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